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INTRODUCTION
In the early 1990s, during the heated public debate befo
passage, and in the years following, many legal experts warned o
Canadian public interest policies.2 These warnings focused on
* Kathleen Cooper graduated from the University of Toronto in 1984 with a specialist degree in
ntal Law 
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interest
LA, 
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 Ontario 
t CELA 
sts across 
as fundamentally changed the relationship that many 
Can d whose 
needless exposure to pesticides for the benefit of present and future 
gene udent-at-
law at CELA, for research assistance on this Article. 
1 North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 
(1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
2 See, e.g., PIERRE MARC JOHNSON & ANDRE BEAULIEU, THE ENVIRONMENT AND NAFTA:
Environmental Studies. Since 1987 Cooper has been with the Canadian Environme
Association (CELA), where she is Senior Researcher and a paralegal. At CELA, Cooper ha
extensively about the associations between toxic substances and children’s health. 
** Kyra Bell-Pasht was called to the Ontario Bar in 2012 and was Counsel to CELA during 20
*** Ramani Nadarajah holds an LLB (1987) and an LLM (2007) in Administrative Law. Since 1994 
Nadarajah has been counsel with CELA, where she represents clients on public 
environmental cases before the courts and administrative tribunals. Prior to joining CE
Nadarajah was a prosecutor with the Ontario Ministry of Environment. 
**** Theresa McClenaghan holds an LLB (1984), an LLM in Constitutional Law (1999
diploma in Environmental Health (1999). McClenaghan is a Bar member of Manitoba and
and has practiced public interest environmental law, both in private practice since 1985 and a
as counsel since 1998, and as Executive Director at CELA since 2007. 
The authors dedicate this Article to the hundreds of environmental and public health activi
Canada whose perseverance over many years h
adians have with the environment around their homes and in their communities, an
efforts have eliminated 
rations and the environment. The authors also wish to acknowledge Rizwan Khan, st
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uébec 
continued to lead the effort against cosmetic pesticide use, passing 
legislation banning cosmetic pesticide use in 2003 that targeted certain 
overall concerns with NAFTA’s Chapter 11 dealing with Investme
the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanisms. First, Ch
11 grants foreign “investors”—that is foreign-based corpora
operating in Canada—wide-reaching, quasi-constitutional commerci
rights.3 Second, despite health and environmental safeguar
NAFTA’s preamble and Chapter 11 itself, the rights granted to inve
would be interpreted and applied by internationally establi
commercially focused tribunals. Therein, additional key aspec
Chapter 11 would be applied that provide for over-arching in
rights. Moreover, these tribunals would operate outside of the Can
judicial system’s existing public-interest and procedural safeguard
could therefore allow bias in favour of foreign investors over the 
of both domestic law and public aspirations for legal reform.4
Concurrent with the NAFTA debate during the early 1990s,
unique step was taken in a small Québec town spawning a po
grassroots movement across Canada. In 1991, following several ye
citizen-led actions seeking reductions in pesticide use, a municip
law passed by Hudson, Québec, banned the cosmetic use of pesticid
private property. The term “cosmetic” refers to pesticide use sole
the purpose of influencing the appearance of lawns or gardens. It i
referred to as non-essential or unnecessary use. The Hudson
challenged in Spraytech v. Hudson, which culminated ten years late
landmark Supreme Court of Canada ruling upholding the by-law.5
After the Hudson decision, dozens of Hudson-style by-laws 
passed across Canada limiting the cosmetic use of pesticides.6 Q
UNDERSTANDING AND IMPLEMENTING THE NEW CONTINENTAL LAW 26, 65 (1996); 
AUDLEY, GREEN POLITICS AND GLOBAL TRADE: NAFTA AND THE FUTURE OF ENVIRON
JOHN J.
MENTAL 
POL anada's ITICS 39 (1997); Michelle Swenarchuk, Stomping on the Earth: Trade, Trade Law, and C
Ecological Footprints, 5 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 197, 198-99 (1998). 
3 See, e.g., Samrat Ganguly, Note, The Investor-State Dispute Mechanism (ISDM
Sovereign's Power To Protect Public Health, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 113, 115-22 (19
) and a 
99). 
man, Canadian Constitutionalism and Sovereignty After 4 See, e.g., David Schneider
NAF anadian TA, 5 CONST. F. 93, 94-98 (1994); Charles E. Reasons, NAFTA and Inequality: A C
Perspective, 5 CONST. F. 72, 74 (1994); Swenarchuk, supra note 2, at 201, 208-14; see also Michael 
W. Dunleavy, The Limits of Free Trade: Sovereignty, Environmental Protection and NAFTA, 51 U.
TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 204, 235-39 (1993). 
5 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d'arrosage) v. Hudson (Town), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 
241 (Can.). 
6 MIKE CHRISTIE, PRIVATE PROPERTY PESTICIDE BY-LAWS IN CANADA: POPULATION
STATISTICS BY MUNICIPALITY (Dec. 31, 2010), available at 
www.flora.org/healthyottawa/BylawList.pdf. 
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the 1980s and early 1990s, developed rapidly at the international level 
and y countries.12 Notably, the Dow claim 
under Chapter 11 challenged the validity of Québec’s application of the 
pesticides and pesticide uses province-wide.7 Ontario followed in 200
with a more comprehensive province-wide cosmetic pesticide ban
prohibited the use and sale of hundreds of pesticide products 
retaining the ability to use pesticides for, among other reasons, 
health and agriculture protection. Currently, additional municipa
laws or provincial laws focused on curtailing the cosmetic use of
sticides are in place or the subject of active debate across the cou
In 2008, NAFTA’s Chapter 11 investor rights provisions inters
with this twenty-year effort to limit cosmetic pesticide use. Dow 
AgroSciences (Dow), a United States-based chemical manufacturer
notice that it would challenge the Québec Pesticides Management C
arguing that Canada was in breach of the minimum standard of treat
and expropriation provisions of Chapter 11. These provisions
subsequent sections of Chapter 11,10 allow companies to sue count
their expected returns on investment are reduced by government ac
Dow sought $2 million in compensation, based on an alleged lack o
process in the passage of Québec’s law and damage to its investm
Canada.11 Notably, the Dow claim was focused on its comm
interest in a single pesticide, 2,4-Dichlorophenoxyacetic acid (2
Though 2,4-D was among the pesticides heavily used for cos
purposes
Canada, as well as other provincial statutes, had to do with many m
pesticides.
The Dow case was largely unsuccessful either in influencin
Québec by-law or in its widely understood purpose: to cre
regulatory chill on further pesticide bans across Canada. Neverthel
is a valuable case study of how investors can attempt to use their 
under NAFTA to thwart the intent of existing laws or to undermin
passage of similar laws elsewhere in the same jurisdiction. 
Lastly, the precautionary principle, which also had its beginni
 in domestic legislation in man
9 Pe
ubmit a 
 American Trade Agreement (Aug. 25, 
2008), available at www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/assets/pdfs/disp-diff/dow-01.pdf. 
12 Owen McIntyre & Thomas Mosedale, The Precautionary Principle as a Norm of 
Customary International Law, 9 J. ENVTL. L. 221, 223-35 (1997). 
7 Pesticides Act, R.S.Q., c. P-9.3, r. 1 (Can.). 
8 Pesticides Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.11 (Can.). 
sticides Act, R.S.Q., c. P-9.3, r. 1 (Can.). 
10 NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 1105, 1110, 1116-1117. 
11 Dow AgroSciences v. Gov’t of Can., NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Notice of Intent To S
Claim to Arbitration Under Chapter Eleven of the North
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en the 
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blic support in 
Canada for a precautionary response to cosmetic pesticide use. 
II. COSMETIC PESTICIDE BANS IN CANADA
A. I
 legal 
ELA)
hools,
 saw 
. The 
 was 
rents 
other
Parks
to avoid the spraying since it made her children 
co rance
inces,
inate
ounds
singly
wned
s.16
In the build-up to the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment 
an de Janeiro, often incomplete but very 
tro many 
precautionary principle.13 This Article addresses the contrast betwe
Dow claim within NAFTA’s narrow focus on commercial interest
the broader lens of longstanding and widespread pu
NTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT
From the mid-1980s onward, a reliable sign of spring for the
intake staff at the Canadian Environmental Law Association (C
was calls from the public about the spraying of pesticides in sc
parks, and playgrounds.14 Typical callers were young mothers who
this spraying as needlessly creating health risks for their children
concerned mothers would ask why the spraying of pesticides
allowed and how they could stop it.15 CELA helped these pa
organize deputations to school boards, municipal parks departments, and
municipal councils. In a more direct approach, one young m
requested the spraying schedule from the City of Toronto 
Department in order 
ugh. When the trucks arrived at the park, the mother had the ent
blockaded with strollers. 
As a result of many such efforts in Ontario and other prov
slow but steady change occurred with many parks departments, school
boards, and even entire municipalities agreeing to reduce or elim
pesticide use on public lands. These efforts often focused on playgr
or other areas used by children. In Québec, these changes increa
occurred via municipal by-laws, as discussed further below. 
Optimistically named “the turnaround decade,” the 1990s da
as a time of tremendous hope for addressing environmental problem
d Development held in Rio 
ubling scientific evidence continued to mount about 
13 Dow AgroSciences, Notice of Intent, ¶ 7. 
14 Statistical tracking of legal intake and summary advice calls and emails at C
required as one condition of funding from Legal Aid Ontario) during the late 1980s and thro
199  indicates dozens of calls per year about pesticide spraying in park
ELA (as 
ugh the 
and schools, and on urban 
lawn ed in intake requests and 
provides a rationale for focusing on pesticide issues in CELA’s organizational strategic planning. 
15 Our colleagues at the Sierra Legal Defense Fund, now Ecojustice Canada, and at the 
Toronto Environmental Alliance, can recall similar heralds of spring in Canada. 
16 See WORLD COMM’N ON ENV’T & DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE (1987). 
0s s
s, beginning in April. This is one of the most common issues rais
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 toxicology, 
this rapidly expanding body of research was later summarized in the 
22 and 
environmental woes. The Rio Declaration on Environment 
Development17 contained twenty-seven lofty principles about moving
towards a more sustainable and equitable world, with Princip
focused o
certainty.
Also during the late 1980s and early 1990s, regulatory actio
being taken in Canada and many other countries on a few highly to
substances, often in response to evidence about cancer risks. Th
actions notably included progressively phasing out s
organochlorine pesticides that would go on to dominate the first 
toxic substances named under the Stockholm Convention on Pers
Organic Pollutants.18 Adding to the evidence about these notorious
pesticides, rapidly growing literature indicated greater vulnerability in 
children to a much longer list of pesticides. These child health risks
comprehensively documented in a landmark U.S. National Resear
ouncil study19 that influenced an overhaul of pesticide regulation i
United States and countries worldwide, including Canada. 
Another emerging area of scientific research was endo
disruption, a term that originated from a multidisciplinary meeting
in 1991 among experts in the fields of anthropology, ecol
comparative endocrinology, histopathology, immunology, mamma
medicine, law, psychiatry, psychoneuroendocrinology, reproductive 
physiology, toxicology, wildlife management, tumor biology,
zoology. A statement issued at the meeting raised alarm bells 
reproductive and other health risks that might result from pre
exposure to toxic substances, including pesticides.20 Going well be
the primary focus on cancer that then dominated regulatory
book Our Stolen Future21 as it continues to be summarized online
az., June 
9 ol. I), 
at www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-
1an
RAMME, STOCKHOLM CONVENTION ON PERSISTENT
OR ble at
ESTICIDES IN THE
DIE
HEMICALLY-INDUCED
ALTE N 1 (1992), available
at  endocrinedisruption.org/assets/media/documents/wingspread_consensus_statement.pdf. 
21 THEO COLBORN ET AL., OUR STOLEN FUTURE: ARE WE THREATENING OUR FERTILITY,
INTELLIGENCE, AND SURVIVAL? A SCIENTIFIC DETECTIVE STORY (1996). 
22 OUR STOLEN FUTURE, www.ourstolenfuture.org (last visited Nov. 20, 2013). 
17 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Br
3-14, 1 92, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (V
Annex I (Aug. 12, 1992), available 
nex1.htm. 
18 UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROG
GANIC POLLUTANTS, Annex A, at 21 (May 22, 2001), availa
www.pops.int/documents/convtext/convtext_en.pdf. 
19 COMM. ON PESTICIDES IN THE DIETS OF INFANTS & CHILDREN ET AL., P
TS OF INFANTS AND CHILDREN 359-63 (1993). 
20 H. BERN ET AL., STATEMENT FROM THE WORK SESSION ON C
RATIONS IN SEXUAL DEVELOPMENT: THE WILDLIFE/HUMAN CONNECTIO
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ly underscore public calls 
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ealth risks that many Canadians supported the ban of 
B.
70,26
ecific
00 to 
mited
 or to 
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s in landscaping and lawn care.  The by-law was passed in 
re
pesticide use.30
In 1992, the municipality charged two landscaping companies, 
extensively in scientific literature.23 This early recognition of endocrine
disrupting chemicals initiated concerns about chronic low
exposures to mixtures of chemicals. Currently, these concerns r
matters of extreme scientific complexity and challenge in the regu
assessment of toxic substances24 and consistent
r reducing chemical exposures whenever possible. 
It was in this context of Rio-inspired optimism for precauti
policy change and the expanding scientific evidence of cancer and
chemical exposure h
cosmetic pesticide use. 
 HUDSON, QUÉBEC: THE MOUSE THAT ROARED25
In 1991, the Town of Hudson, Québec, adopted By-law 2
which restricted the use of pesticides within its perimeter to sp
locations and enumerated uses, and imposed fines ranging from $1
$4,000 for its violation.27 The by-law allowed continued, but li
pesticide use. For example, pesticides could be used by farmers
protect public health.28 But the by-law essentially banned pesticid
cosmetic use 29
sponse to public concerns regarding safety and the adverse effects of
23 See, e.g., Evanthia Diamanti-Kandarakis et al., Endocrine-Disrupting Chemic
Endocrine Society Scientific Statement, 30 ENDOCRINE REV. 293 (2009); R. Thomas Zoell
Endocrine-Disrupting Chemicals and Public Health Protection: A Statement of Principles
als: An 
er et al., 
 from the 
S ENV’T
ergman 
ng.pdf. 
Y:
 on the 
s, EUR. PARL. DOC. P7_TA(2013)0091 (2013). 
RD WIBBERLEY, THE MOUSE THAT ROARED (1955). This Cold War satirical novel 
pro er satirical works in the same genre and ongoing usage of the book title to 
cha vid-and-Goliath-type political struggles. 
C.R.
-law responded to residents’ concerns, repeatedly expressed since 1985.”); 
id. ¶ 13 (“[T]he by-law was enacted by the Town in the public interest and in response to health 
concerns expressed by residents. The court noted that these concerns were recorded in the Town 
Council’s meeting minutes and manifested themselves in letters to Council, as well as a petition with 
more than 300 signatures.”). 
Endocrine Society, 2012 ENDOCRINOLOGY 4097; WORLD HEALTH ORG. & UNITED NATION
PROGRAMME, STATE OF THE SCIENCE OF ENDOCRINE-DISRUPTING CHEMICALS 2012 (Åke B
et a s., 2013) vailable ww .who t/iri bit trel. ed , a at w .in s/ s am/10665/78101/1/9789241505031_e
24 ANDREAS KORTENCAMP ET AL., STATE OF THE ART REPORT ON MIXTURE TOXICIT
FINAL REPORT 7-165 (Dec. 22, 2009); European Parliament Resolution of 14 March 2013
Pro uptertection of Public Health from Endocrine Disr
25 LEONA
mpted furth
racterize Da
26 HUDSON, QUE., BY-LAW 270 (1991) (Can.). 
27 Id. art. 11. 
28 Id. art. 3. 
29 Id. art. 2. 
30 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d'arrosage) v. Hudson (Town), [2001] 2 S.
241, ¶ 6 (Can.) (“The by
6
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fforts 
rivate 
ébec
 the 
xisted 
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ulate
 with 
hood
many other activists in town hall meetings, 
or ficials
mpted 
as to 
pared
Act.39
ations
the organizations encountered sympathetic ears among many politicians, 
the oft-repeated response was the fear of lawsuits and the need to wait 
Spraytech and Chemlawn, with unpermitted use of pesticide
contravention of the by-law.31 The companies plead not guilty and 
the court to declare the by-law outside the Town’s authority.32
Québec Superior Court denied the companies’ motion for a decla
judgment and upheld the validity of the by-law,33 and the Québec 
of Appeal affirmed the ruling.34 Nearly ten years after the by-law
enacted, th
 Canada.35
A notable difference between the Hudson by-law and other e
to control pesticide use was that the Hudson by-law included p
property. Hudson’s power to create the by-law derived from the Qu
Cities and Towns Act.36 Indeed, by the time the case reached
Supreme Court, over thirty-five similar municipal by-laws e
elsewhere in Québec. The very strong public sentiment in favour of
by-laws was epitomized in a high-profile campaign led by an artic
young cancer survivor, Jean-Dominic Lévesque-René. Diagnosed
Non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma in 1994, Jean-Dominic spent his child
and teenage years alongside 
ganizing protests, and lobbying municipalities and provincial of
to ban cosmetic pesticide use.37
These actions, mostly by small municipalities in Québec, pro
the Toronto Environmental Alliance to seek CELA’s advice 
whether similar powers existed in Ontario. A generic opinion38 pre
in 1999 confirmed that Ontario municipalities had similar powers to pass 
pesticide control by-laws under the provincial Municipal 
Bolstered by this opinion, health and environmental organiz
stepped up their lobbying efforts in many Ontario municipalities. While
7. 
llenging 
.
al Pesticide By-Laws: Preliminary Legal Opinion 
for th npublished opinion) (on file with authors); see also
Theresa McClenaghan, Bill 111—Ontario’s New Municipal Act and Pesticide By-law Powers, 26 
INTERVENOR (2001), available at www.cela.ca/article/hudson-quebec-pesticide-law/bill-111-
ontarios-new-municipal-act-and-pesticide-law-powers. 
39 Municipal Act, 2001, S.O. 2001, c. 25 (Can.). 
31 ¶ Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. ¶ 10. 
34 Id. ¶ 13. 
35 Id. ¶ 1. 
36 Cities and Towns Act, R.S.Q., c. C-19 (Can.). 
37 Michelle Lalonde, Pesticide Fight Heads for Top Court: Lawn-Care Firms Cha
Municipal Ban on Controversial Chemicals, THE MONTREAL GAZETTE, Dec. 4, 2000, at A1
38 Theresa McClenaghan, Ontario Municip
e Toronto Environmental Alliance (1999) (u
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-law.
rected to bringing the implications of the case for other 
provinces to the Court’s attention.40
C. THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA’S DECISION IN HUDSON
anada
 was 
this 
t the 
pects
o multiple
tive and obiter reasons given by the Court. 
1.
 party 
st for 
ention
ties.43
ers to 
st the 
ns in 
re the 
roup’s 
expertise and special knowledge to bear on a particular legal issue.46 The 
ntion
for the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision on the Hudson by
CELA’s later intervention in the Hudson case before the Supreme Court 
was primarily di
In 2001, a unanimous decision by the Supreme Court of C
upheld the trial and appellate courts’ determination that the by-law
valid.41 Multiple aspects of the Hudson decision are relevant to
Article’s discussion of issues that arose in the Dow claim agains
Québec Pesticides Management Code under Chapter 11. These as
range from the procedural access and rights accorded t
interveners to the substan
 Procedural Fairness 
The Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada provide that any
may bring a motion for leave to intervene before a judge.42 The te
intervention is set out in Rule 57, which provides that an interv
must be relevant, useful, and different from those of the other par
Essentially, the Supreme Court is looking to public interest interven
help in the development of legal principles.44 Interveners can assi
Court by explaining how a particular legal issue has implications in the 
broader public policy context and its potential to impact decisio
other cases or circumstances, which extend beyond the appeal befo
Court.45 Interveners can also aid the Court by bringing a g
Court grants most applications for leave to intervene.47 Once interve
40 TORONTO ENVTL. ALLIANCE ET AL., FACTUM OF THE INTERVENERS (Sept
available at s.cela.ca/files/uploads/ff_hudson.pdf. 
. 2000), 
 Hudson (Town), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 
241
9 (Can.), amended by
SO an.); see 
R/2011-
te). 
tervention, 21 NAT’L 27, 29 (2012), available at
ww -November-2012/The-art-of-intervention.aspx.
45 Benjamin R.D. Alarie & Andrew J. Green, Interventions Before the Supreme Court of 
41 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d'arrosage) v.
 (Can.). 
42 Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, SOR/2002-156, 55-5
R/2011-74 (applicable to intervention and governing motions for leave to intervene) (C
Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26 (Can.) (the enabling statute). 
43 Rules of the Supreme Court of Canda, SOR/2002-156. 57 (Can.), amended by SO
74 (Can.); see Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26 (Can.) (the enabling statu
44 Emily White, The Art of In
w.nationalmagazine.ca/Articles/October
Canada: Accuracy, Affiliation, and Acceptance, 48 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 381, 400 (2010). 
46 White, supra note 44, at 29. 
47 Alarie & Green, supra note 45, at 400. 
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without requiring amendment of the provincial enabling legislation.”53
Because such general grants of power are not accompanied by more 
specific grants (there being none in 
has been granted, an intervener is allowed to file a brief factum and 
 appearance before the Supreme Court at the case hearing.48
CELA sought to intervene on its own behalf and also repres
one individual and nine other groups ranging from community-
citizens groups to national organizations.49 The Sierra Legal De
Fund (SLDF), a national environmental organization now know
Ecojustice Canada, also intervened on behalf of the Federat
Canadian Municipalities, World Wildlife Fund Canada, and N
Action Québec Incorporated. CELA and SLDF c
t  raise a complementary set of issues with the Court. 
 Substantive and Obiter Reasons for Denying the Appeal 
The appellants in Hudson argued that the by-law was invali
ultra vires on the grounds that it was not authorized under prov
enabling legislation, and it conflicted with federal and provincial
related to pesticides.50 Concerning the power delegated to 
 pass by-laws, the appellants argued that this delegated authorit
not include the power to regulate the use of pesticides.51
CELA’s amicus brief argued for the government’s abili
legislate and create by-laws because these “are political activities, c
out by the elected representatives, based upon community concern
standards, balancing a number of competing interests,” in contrast 
appellant’s argument that such measures had to be “wise scie
decisions.”52 The Supreme Court agreed with the arguments advanc
CELA and SLDF that the municipality legitimately relied upon
“general welfare” powers under Section 410 of the Cities and T
Act, noting these more open-ended provisions “allow municipalit
respond expeditiously to new challenges facing local commu
the Cities and Towns Act relating to 
48 Id. at 383. 
49 The interveners represented by CELA were the Canadian Environmental Law Association, 
Tor  Healthy 
 Pesticide Action Group Kitchener, Working Group on the Health Dangers 
of t cides, Environmental Action Barrie, Breast Cancer Prevention Coalition, 
Vau ual, Dr. Merryl Hammond. 
tech, Société d'arrosage) v. Hudson (Town), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 
241, ¶¶ 7, 17, 24, 34 (Can.). 
51 Id. ¶¶ 12-13, 17, 34. 
52 TORONTO ENVTL. ALLIANCE ET AL., supra note 40, ¶ 26. 
53 See Hudson, 2 S.C.R. 241, ¶ 19. 
onto Environmental Alliance, Sierra Club of Canada, Parents’ Environmental Network,
Lawns–Healthy People,
h
han Environmental Action Committee, and one individ
e Urban Use of Pesti
g
50 114957 Canada Ltée (Spray
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preme
Court accepted SLDF’s argument that the preventative approach taken 
by cides was 
consistent with the precautionary principle.62 Noting the work of 
pesticide use), the issue for the Court was whether general w
ovisions, absent a specific grant, could authorize By-law 270.54
The Supreme Court found that such open-ended provisions 
indeed authorize by-laws outside of any specific grant of power
noted as a limitation that the issue “must be closely related t
immediate interests of the community within [its] territorial limits
agreed that this was the case for a by-law that concerned the us
protection of the local environment within the community.55 More
further concurring with arguments raised in CELA’s amicus brie
Supreme Court noted that similar by-law making powers exist in
other provinces. 
To the issue of the appellant’s claim of conflict with provinci
federal statutes, throughout the decision, the Supreme Court 
echoed the arguments advanced by CELA and SLDF.56 The Sup
Court noted that federal pesticide legislation provides a regist
process to address the import, export, manufacture, sale, packagin
labeling of pesticides in Canada.57 At the provincial level, pesticid
regulates permitting and licensing of vendors and commercial applic
or pesticides.58 The municipal by-law was narrowly focused and im
restrictions on pesticide application use within a specific geogra
locale by applying legitimate powers to enact by-laws for the “g
welfare” of the community in response to local challenges 
concerns.59 Thus, the Supreme Court held that the Hudson by-law
not occupy the same field as the provincial and federal regu
fra 60mework.  Indeed, the court found that the by-law was in
complementary to federal and provincial law and observed that, “[a
with By-law 270, these laws establish a tri-level regulatory regime.”
In concluding its discussion on statutory interpretation, the Su
 the Town of Hudson to restrict the non-essential use of pesti
54 Id. ¶ 52. 
55 Id. ¶¶ 53-54. 
 30, 35-39, 44-46, 48-49; see also JERRY V. DEMARCO, ASSESSING 
THE BLIC INTEREST INTERVENTIONS ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE 
OF CANADA: A QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS, 30 S.C.L.R.
(2d) 4 (2005). 
on, 2 S.C.R. 241, ¶ 35. 
 36, 39. 
59 Id. ¶¶ 3, 23, 26-27, 49. 
60 Id. ¶ 31. 
61 Id. ¶ 39. 
62 Id. ¶ 31. 
56 Id. ¶¶ 18-20, 22-24, 27,
IMPACT OF PU
THE SUPREME COURT OF
299, 321-2
57 Huds
58 Id. ¶¶
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The Hudson case was hailed as a major victory by environmental, 
hea ision, 
multiple scholars,63 the Supreme Court stated in obiter, “there m
currently sufficient state practice to allow a good argument tha
precautionary principle is a principle of customary international la
Additionally, the Supreme Court noted, “in the context o
precautionary prin
ell under their rubric of preventive action.”65
The Hudson decision exemplifies how public interest interv
can provide important assistance to the courts. The Supreme Cour
explicitly acknowledged this influential role,66 and it has 
established qualitatively and quantitatively in an analysis of several
before the Supreme Court between 1992 and 2004, including Huds
The analysis showed that the Supreme Court rarely indicates w
aspects of its decisions interveners influence.68 However, by care
reviewing the full range of written interventions and suppo
authorities and then comparing these materials to the Supreme C
decisions, this analysis shows a profound influence. For exampl
Supreme Court primarily relied upon those authorities introduced 
main parties, as would be expected.69 However, for those autho
uniquely introduced by public interest interveners across seven dif
cases, the author noted that “[r]egardless of the reasons, it is quite
that, judged from the perspective of unique authorities, i
indeed kept t
and have added immense value to the Court’s jurisprudenc
D. HUDSON-STYLE BY-LAWS PROLIFERATE ACROSS CANADA
lth, and community groups.71 Following the Supreme Court dec
63 JAMES CAMERON & JULI ABOUCHAR, The Status of the Precautionary Pr
In
inciple in 
ternational Law, in THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 29 (David 
Fre
3, at 30-
es v. Canada (Minister of Emp’t & Immigration), [1992] 1 
S.C. (“Public interests organizations are, as they should be, frequently granted intervener 
stat s and submissions of interveners on issues of public importance frequently provide 
great assistance to the courts.”). 
69 Id. at 310. 
70 Id. at 311. 
71 CANADIAN ENVTL. LAW ASS’N, VICTORY FOR PESTICIDE REDUCTION AND LOCAL
DEMOCRACY (June 28, 2001), available at www.cela.ca/newsevents/media-release/victory-
estone & Ellen Hey eds., 1996); McIntyre & Mosedale, supra note 12. 
64 See Hudson, 2 S.C.R. 241, ¶ 32 (quoting CAMERON & ABOUCHAR, supra note 6
31). 
65 Id. ¶ 32. 
66 Canadian Council of Church
R. 236, ¶ 43 
us. The view
67 DEMARCO, supra note 56, at 330. 
68 Id. at 301. 
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77
E. PROVINCE-WIDE BANS IN QUÉBEC AND ONTARIO
the frontline of this movement. As a result of 
municipalities across the country were faced with a rise of p
demand to enact similar pesticide by-laws. Many did so increasing
larger cities. For example, Toronto undertook a scientific lit
review and extensive public consultation that culminated in a Hu
style by-law in 2003. After reviewing the evidence about pest
risks,72 Toronto’s Medical Officer of Health supported a b
concluding with language grounded in a precautionary approach
“when risks to human health are unnecessary or uncertain, the wisest
course of action is to substitute safer alternatives and methods, 
than incurring risks that may prove unacceptable in the long run.”73
involvement and support of progressive voices in the medical profes
from local physicians to officials in public health departmen
provincial and national organizations, was highly influential in the
and provincial campaigns that occurred following the Supreme 
ruling.
A strategic choice was made in numerous municipalities to 
the chance of lawsuits and strictly follow the Hudson model. Tor
confirmed the wisdom of this approach when CropLife Canad
association representing pesticide manufacturers, filed a la
challenging the by-law. However, echoing the Québec Superio
Appeal Courts in Hudson, the Ontario Superior Court74 and the O
Court of Appeal75 up-held Toronto’s by-law under Ontario’s Mun
Act, citing the Supreme Court decision in Hudson. CropLife sought
to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, but its application
dismissed given that the issues to be addressed wer  s
to those in Hudson.76 At present, there are over 1
effect across Canada with more being actively discussed.
Québec continued in 
pes
IEW OF HUMAN 
EX 2), available at
ww
 TORONTO PUB. HEALTH, PLAYING IT SAFE: HEALTHY CHOICES ABOUT LAWN CARE 
PES
2003), 68 O.R. 3d 520 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.). 
2005), 75 O.R. 3d 357, aff'd, (2003) 68 O.R. 3d 520 (Can. 
Ont. C.A.). 
76 Croplife Canada v. Toronto (2005), 75 O.R. 3d 357, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused,
31036 (Nov. 17, 2005) (Can.). 
77 CHRISTIE, supra note 6, at 1. 
ticide-reduction-and-local-democracy. 
72 TORONTO PUB. HEALTH, LAWN AND GARDEN PESTICIDES: A REV
POSURE & HEALTH EFFECTS RESEARCH (Apr. 200
w.toronto.ca/health/pesticides/pdf/pesticides_lawnandgarden.pdf.
73
TICIDES 1 (Apr. 2002), available at www.toronto.ca/health/hphe/pdf/playingitsafe.pdf. 
74 Croplife Canada v. Toronto (
75 Croplife Canada v. Toronto (
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Québec officials also pointed to biomonitoring results in Québec 
children that arried 
r), but 
extensive public consultation beginning in 1998, Québec passed
legislation banning certain pesticide uses on a province-wide basis.78
Pesticides Management Code,79 enacted in 2003 but not implem
until 2006, prohibited the use and sale of thirteen active ingredie
insecticides, herbicides, and fungicides then typically used in lawn
and specified a list of low-risk bio-pesticides allowed for use insid
outside child care centers and elementary and secondary schools.80
under the Hudson-style by-laws, golf courses were exempt
requirements were put in place for them to develop pesticide reduction 
plans.81
Québec devised a screening method to decide which pesticid
include that involved comparing pesticides commonly used in lawn
with lists of chemicals associated with cancer or endocrine disru
Regarding 2,4-D specifically, all forms of this pesticide were includ
the ban because, as one of the chlorophenoxy herbicides, it had been
assified as a possible human carcinogen by the International Ag
for Research on Cancer.82
The main reason for the ban was to limit the harmful effec
pesticides on human health—especially on the health of children
on the environment. This rationale flowed from the March 
recommendations of the Groupe de réflexionsur les pesticides en m
urbain, a focus group organized to consolidate the results of public
consultation and mandated to address means of reducing pesticide u
green space maintenance.83 Their recommendations derived from
guiding principles—precaution and exemplary behavior. They noted
precaution was necessary since the toxicity of pesticides has yet 
thoroughly studied and thus they must be used carefully. Exem
behavior would help contribute to changing habits through pest
management in urban environments.  
 showed ninety-eight percent of all children c
pesticides in their bodies from various sources (e.g. food, wate
esticides Management Code, GOV’T OF QUÉBEC,
ww ).
IARC
July 16, 2013), available at 
monographs.iarc.fr/ENG/Classification/ClassificationsAlphaOrder.pdf. 
83 GROUPE DE REFLEXIONSUR LES PESTICIDES EN MILIEU URBAIN, RAPPORT [REPORT] Mar. 
2002 (Can.), available at www.mddep.gouv.qc.ca/pesticides/reflexion/rapport-pesticide.pdf. Note 
this document is only available in French. 
78 The P
w.mddep.gouv.qc.ca/pesticides/permis-en/code-gestion-en/#why (last updated Mar. 2011
79 Pesticides Act, R.S.Q., c. P-9.3, r. 1 (Can.). 
80 Id. arts. 25-26, 31-33, scheds. I-II. 
81 Id. arts. 73-74. 
82 INT’L AGENCY FOR RESEARCH ON CANCER, AGENTS CLASSIFIED BY THE
MONOGRAPHS 11 (
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lming
public 
consultation Ontario passed the most comprehensive legislation in North 
America. The law was passed in June 2008 but slated for proclamation in 
found lawn-care herbicides only in those children living in municip
without a pesticide ban.84 More generally, the precautionary foun
of the Québec law derived from the opinion of public health experts
stated in an earlier report from the Québec National Public H
Institute that based on “data which are presently available, the fac
certain aspects remain poorly understood, and the increased vulnera
of certain groups provide ample reason to justify taking a pru
approach and
pesticide use.”85
In 2007, a newly elected Liberal government in Ontario conf
an election promise that it was committed to enacting legislation
province-wide ban on cosmetic pesticide use. Calling for this law 
broad-based coalition of health and environmental organizations,86 many 
of whom had documented the greater risk to children from pestici
including a comprehensive literature review by the Ontario Colle
Family Physicians.88 Repeated opinion polling89 showed overwhe
public support for the ban, and after two years of extensive 
84 CARACTÉRISATION DE L’EXPOSITION AUX PESTICIDES UTILISÉS EN MILIEU RES
CHEZ DES ENFANTS QUÉBÉCOIS AGES DE 3 Â 7 ANS [CHARACTERIZAT
IDENTIAL 
ION OF EXPOSURE TO 
PES RS] Aug. 
ions/319-
ment is only available in French. 
AN USE
ons/206-
MENTAL 
lable at 
N’S
HUMAN 
sticides-
ble at
REPORT
at
dditional
th results 
t for bans on cosmetic pesticide use. Results of 
additional polls with similar results conducted at the municipal or provincial level from across 
Canada are summarized on the Coalition for Healthy Ottawa’s website. Pesticide Polls and Surveys 
Across Canada, THE COALITION FOR A HEALTHY OTTAWA, www.flora.org/healthyottawa/pesticide-
ban-public-opinion-poll.htm (last updated May 24, 2012). 
TICIDES USED IN RESIDENTIAL ENVIRONMENTS IN QUÉBEC CHILDREN AGES 3 TO 7 YEA
2004 (Can.), available at www.inspq.qc.ca/pdf/publicat
CaracterisationPesticidesEnfants.pdf. Note this docu
85 INSTITUT NATIONAL DE SANTE PUBLIQUE DU QUÉBEC, THOUGHTS ON URB
PESTICIDES 8 (Dec. 2001), available at www.inspq.qc.ca/pdf/publicati
ThoughtsOnUrbanUsePesticides.pdf.
86 CANADIAN ASS’N OF PHYSICIANS FOR THE ENV’T ET AL., HEALTH AND ENVIRON
ORGANIZATIONS SUPPORT ONTARIO-WIDE BAN ON COSMETIC PESTICIDES (Jan. 2008), avai
s.cela.ca/files/uploads/ONPesticideBanStatement.pdf.
87 CHILDREN’S HEALTH PROJECT, ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARD SETTING AND CHILDRE
HEALTH (May 25, 2000), available at s.cela.ca/pdf/CHP.pdf. 
88 THE ONTARIO COLL. OF FAMILY PHYSICIANS, SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF PESTICIDE
HEALTH EFFECTS 167-69 (Apr. 23, 2004), available at www.ocfp.on.ca/docs/pe
paper/pesticides-paper.pdf?sfvrsn=1. 
89 See, e.g., Press Release, Can. Ass’n of Physicians for the Envt., As Gov’t Prepares Regs, 
Health and Enviro Groups Want End to Spraying (Sept. 4, 2008), availa
s.cela.ca/files/uploads/MR080904_pesticidepoll.pdf; ORACLE POLL RESEARCH, SURVEY
(Feb. 2007), available 
www.flora.org/healthyottawa/PFO%20CAPE%20Ont%20Poll%202007.pdf. Numerous a
polls were conducted in Ontario municipalities during debates about pesticide by-laws, wi
consistently showing 70% and higher levels of suppor
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ental 
 for a 
developmental neurotoxicity study and a multi-generation reproductive 
study, and noted “additional protective measures have been incorporated 
the following year after the creation of implementing regulations. It
into force on Earth Day, April 22, 2009, banning the use and s
hundreds of pesticides end-use products. The Ontario legislation stay
within the Hudson by-law model of an overall ban with exceptio
allow the use of pesticides for limited reasons such as public h
protectio 90
HE RE-EVALUATION OF 2,4-D
The Québec92 and Ontario93 bans included the pesticide 2,4-D, 
its various end-product uses for lawn care. During the three
implementation phase for the Québec law lasting from 2003 to 200
province committed to review its inclusion of 2,4-D in light 
ongoing re-evaluation,94 which began in 200495 by the Pest Manage
egulatory Agency (PMRA), a department of Health Canada respo
for pesticide registration. 
In May 2008, PMRA finalized its re-evaluation process and al
the continued sale and use of certain products containing 2
including those used for lawn and turf.96 Revisions to label requirem
addressed worker health and safety issues as well as environm
releases.97 The decision also included a data call-in requirement
t. 7.1 (Can.). 
 63/09, 
ENV’T,
 at
ivedocs/
n, ¶ 29
isputes/Canada/Dow/Dow-Canada-NOA.pdf 
(“In ntinuing 
PA and 
nue to be prohibited for precautionary reasons until the availability of the 
prod
RY AGENCY, RE-EVALUATION OF THE LAWN 
AND PROPOSED ACCEPTABILITY FOR CONTINUING REGISTRATION – PACR
2005-01 (Feb. 21, 2005). 
96 HEALTH CANADA PEST MGMT. REGULATORY AGENCY, RE-EVALUATION DECISION: (2,4-
DICHLOROPHENOXY) ACETIC ACID [2,4-D] (May 16, 2008). 
97 Id. at 1, 3, 6-7, 49-59. 
90 Pesticides Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.11, ar
91 Pesticides Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.11, arts. 7.1(2), 35(1) (Can.); Pesticides Act, R.O.
arts.18-20 (Can.). 
92 Pesticides Act, R.S.Q., c. P-9.3, r. 1 (Can.). 
93 Pesticides Act, R.O. 63/09, arts. 4(5), 16 (Can.); ONTARIO MINISTRY OF THE
CLASS 9 PESTICIDES 1 (June 28, 2013), available
www.ene.gov.on.ca/stdprodconsume/groups/lr/@ene/@category/@pesticides/documents/nat
stdprod_080203.pdf. 
94 Dow AgroSciences v. Gov’t of Can., NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Notice of Arbitratio
(Mar. 31, 2009), available at www.naftaclaims.com/D
 the March 5, 2003 news release announcing the Code, Québec stated that: Due to the co
uncertainty about their harmfulness herbicides made up of active ingredients, 2,4-D, MC
Mecoprop will conti
ucts' re-evaluation results by recognized organizations.”). 
95 HEALTH CANADA PEST MGMT. REGULATO
TURF USES OF 2,4-D,
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meetings, before municipal councils and committees, in public education 
workshops and more, these groups achieved significant public policy 
into the risk assessment to account for this data gap.”98 The United S
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had come to a s
conclusion in 2005 about allowing continued use of 2,4-D, but also 
that concern existed about the potential for endocrine disruption and a 
lack of 
tential.99
Despite the results of PMRA’s re-evaluation of 2,4-D, both Qu
and Ontario maintained their approach of banning this pesticid
cosmetic purposes.100 The legislative authority to do so is clear in
provincial law may be more, but not less, restrictive than federa
dealing with the same matter, so long as it does not conflict wit
intent of federal law.101 As noted above, this provincial sphere
authority was discussed in detail in the Supreme Court’s ruling
Hudson, where the Court described provincial legislation as 
complementary to federal and municipal regulation
establishing a “tri-level regulatory regime.”102
AGAIN
In summary, for more than fifteen years diverse civil society g
in Canada sought and obtained precautionary public policy supp
reduce health and environmental risks from the non-essential u
pesticides.103 While 2,4-D often received the most attention throu
this debate,104 the bans were never intended to be confined to this s
pesticide. Through democratic action at the local level, in town
D (June 
ed.pdf.
2001] 2 
an, Ban 
 Hudson 
cy (Apr. 
cela.ca/files/uploads/508_2_4_D.pdf; Response to Consultation, Beyond 
Pesticides (Washington, D.C., on behalf of 51 organizations), 2,4-Dichlorophenoxyacetic Acid Risk 
Assessment, Docket ID No. OPP-2004-0167 (Mar. 4, 2005) (on file with authors); Meg Sears et al., 
Pesticide Assessment: Protecting Public Health on the Home Turf, 11(4) PAEDIATRICS & CHILD 
HEALTH 229, 233 (Apr. 2006). 
98 Id. at 8. 
99 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REREGISTRATION ELIGIBILITY DECISION FOR 2,4-
20 e at www.epa.gov/oppsrrd1/REDs/24d_r05), availabl
100 See supra Part II.D-E. 
101 See 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d'arrosage) v. Hudson (Town), [
S.C.R. 241, ¶¶ 11, 16-19, 26, 28-29, 35, 37-39 (Can.). 
102 Id. ¶ 39. 
103 See supra Part II.A-B, D-E; see also Kathleen Cooper & Theresa McClenagh
Stands: Canadian Municipalities Have the Power To Restrict Pesticide Use Thanks to
Québec and the Supreme Court, 31 ALTERNATIVES J. 2, 23 (2005). 
104 See, e.g., Letter from Can. Envt’l Law Ass’n et al. to Pest Mgmt. Regulatory Agen
22, 2005), available at s.
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By-law 270 in a manner that was consistent with international law’s 
III. DOW’S NAFTA CHALLENGE TO QUÉBEC’S PESTICIDES
MANAGEMENT C
dson,
cally, 
multi-
lding
 11’s 
ISDS mechanism to make claims challenging environmental and health 
regulations. Analysts pointed to “the unexpectedly broad and aggressive 
us elfare
changes followed by the passage of local by-laws restricting the u
pesticides on private property.105 The groups also pushed fo
participated in multi-year, multi-stake
view to obtaining province-wide bans.106
Likewise in the courts, particularly in Canada’s highest 
procedural rights enabled public interest organizations and citize
bring much broader considerations of public policy than jus
arguments advanced by the pesticide companies in Hudson.107
Supreme Court of Canada was clearly influenced by the submi
made by the public interest interveners, and the extent of their influ
is reflected in “several passages in the judgment ranging from
contextual statements (such as the opening passage) to the heart o
legal question on appeal (such as the appropriate conflict test).”10
judgment set a precedent in guiding municipalities on how they
legitimately use municipal powers to protect health and environmen
more broadly, incorpor
precautionary principle.109
ODE
A. INTRODUCTION AND NAFTA CONTEXT
In the years following the Supreme Court decision in Hu
municipal by-laws were proliferating across Canada. Specifi
Québec and Ontario were considering provincial statutes, and the 
year process continued to re-evaluate 2,4-D. The parallel story unfo
in the late 1990s and early 2000s was the use of NAFTA Chapter
e of this process to challenge public policy and public w
105 See supra Part II.B, D. 
 Release, Can. Envt’l Law Ass’n, CELA in Cheering 
Sec Wide Ban on Non-Essential Pesticides (Aug. 30, 2007), available at
ww ial-
108 Id. at 324. 
109 Id. at 324; see also Arlene Kwasniak & Alison Peel, Municipal Regulation of Pesticide 
Use, 16(3) ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CENTRE OF ALBERTA NEWS BRIEF (2001), available at
www.elc.ab.ca/pages/Publications/NewsBrief.aspx?id=476. 
106 See supra Part II.E; see, e.g., Press
ti
w.cela.ca/newsevents/media-release/cela-cheering-section-province-wide-ban-non-essent
pesticides.
on for Province-
107 See DEMARCO, supra note 56, at 321-24. 
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mechanisms had existed in bilateral investment agreements between 
developed and developin 117  first 
measures, including environmental measures.”110 Trade schola
commented on the significant imbalance between private inve
rights and the protection and promotion of the broader public 
under NAFTA’s Chapter 11 regime.111 They noted that this dispa
exacerbated by the lack of transparency and public access to the pr
the limited opportunity for public participation, and
er the actual adjudication of arbitration proceedings.112
In contrast, investors contemplating initiating a claim face vir
no constraints other than to follow the procedural requirement set 
Section B of Chapter 11.113 Filing a Notice of Intent to arbitrate, 
triggers a consultation process, commences the investor claim pro
The investor is then required to file the actual Notice of Arbitration
investor may submit a dispute to arbitration through one of the two 
methods provided by the International Centre for the Settleme
Investment Disputes (ICSID) or through the processes provided b
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).
Thus, when the claim is issued, a process selected by the inv
governs the arbitration.114 For many years, there was no legal oblig
on governments to make these notices public,115 though policy has
changed in this area, as discussed in more detail below with resp
the adjudication of NAFTA di
requirement is that a claimant notify the NAFTA Commission Secre
of its request to convene a panel.116
It is noteworthy that, for al ost a century prior to NAFTA, 
g countries.  Uniquely, NAFTA was the
110 HOWARD MANN & KONRAD VON MOLTKE, NAFTA'S CHAPTER 11 AN
ENVIRONMENT: ADDRESSING THE IMPACTS OF THE INVESTOR-STATE PROCESS O
ENVIRONMENT 5 (1999), available at www.iisd.org/pdf/nafta.pdf. 
D THE 
N THE 
 HOWARD MANN, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., PRIVATE RIGHTS, PUBLIC 
PR IGHTS (2001), 
av e_citizensguide.pdf; Chris Tollefson, Games Without Frontiers: 
Investor Claims and Citizen Submissions Under the NAFTA Regime, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 141, 147-
49
 Tollefson, 0.
37.
EE TRADE COMM’ , NOTES OF INTERPRETATION OF CERTAIN 
CH at
ereinafter NOTES OF 
INTERPRETATION].
116 Tollefson, supra note 111, at 163. 
117 KYLA TIENHAARA, THE EXPROPRIATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE:
PROTECTING FOREIGN INVESTORS AT THE EXPENSE OF PUBLIC POLICY 40 (2009). 
111
OBLEMS: A GUIDE TO NAFTA’S CONTROVERSIAL CHAPTER ON INVESTOR R
ailable at www.iisd.org/pdf/trad
 (2002). 
112 supra note 111, at 148-49, 162-65; see also MANN, supra note 111, at 2
113 MANN, supra note 111, at 39. 
114 Id. at 
115 Id. at 42; see also NAFTA FR N
APTER 11 PROVISIONS (July 31, 2001), available 
www.naftaclaims.com/files/NAFTA_Comm_1105_Transparency.pdf [h
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owing
sputes
t lack 
ion. It 
environmental and health protections contained therein; and two of 
Chapter 11’s substantive rights, namely those relied upon by Dow in its 
N
to contain ISDS provisions applying to more than one deve
country.118 Such provisions originated to protect investments from
developed judicial systems prevalent in developing countries,1
otherwise politically unstable countries120 where investors demand
security of a neutral and binding international tribunal before whic
could advance claims against governme
bstantial loss, of their investment value.121
Under NAFTA, ISDS claims have proliferated against Can
public interest measures. By January 2013, thirty-four NAFTA inv
claims had been commenced against Canada. Close to half of those
claims were related to environmental and health policy measures
Table 1). Commenting on this trend as early as 1999, analysts noted
“the provisions designed to ensure security and predictability for
investors have now created uncertainty and unpredictability for 
environmental (and other) regulators.”122
There is rich irony here. The ISDS mechanism originated
means to protect the rights of investors from unfair or arbitrary acti
countries with less developed judicial systems.123 However, in Ca
the NAFTA ISDS arbitration mechanism can undermine domestic p
interest regulation124 while providing the public with greatly l
recourse to 
sophisticated procedural tools available to them within Canada’s m
judicial system. 
Before turning to the particulars of the Dow claim, the foll
section reviews the procedures for adjudication of Chapter 11 di
and associated procedural reform efforts to address criticisms abou
of public access to proceedings that concern public interest regulat
is followed by brief summaries of two aspects of NAFTA: the nature of 
otice of Arbitration: Articles 1105 and 1110. 
Francis C.R. Price, Public Good: Private Gain. NAFTA, Chapter 11, 26 LAWNOW 36, 36 
(D
 VON MOLTKE, supra note 110, at 48; TIENHAARA, supra note 117, at 48. 
124 Gus Van Harten, Reforming the NAFTA Investment Regime, in BOS. UNIV., THE FUTURE
OF NORTH AMERICAN TRADE POLICY: LESSONS FROM NAFTA 43-46 (Nov. 2009), available at
www.bu.edu/pardee/files/2009/11/Pardee-Report-NAFTA.pdf. 
125 Id. at 47-48. 
118
ec. 1, 2001). 
119 TIENHAARA, supra note 117, at 48. 
120 MANN, supra note 111, at 5, 7. 
121 Id.
122 MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 110, at 5. 
123 MANN &
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pret the rights 
granted to investors within Chapter 11 in the context of NAFTA’s 
objectives, which are purely commercial, set forth in Article 102. 
order 
arties;
ies of 
ent of 
l property rights in each Party’s territory; 
n
tion of 
disputes; and 
l
Since NAFTA’s adoption, efforts have been made to improve 
transparency of the decisionmaking process in response to claims that 
C mmercial rights of foreign 
Adjudication of Chapter 11 Disputes 
A three-member tribunal adjudicates investor claims under Ch
11. The disputing parties, that is, the investor and the state,
nominate a member while a third neutral arbitrator is appointed o
agreement of both Parties or by the Secretary General of the ICSID fro
the ICSID Panel of Arbitrators.126 Although this is the norm
commercial arbitration, critics have charged that Chapter 1
problematic when issues of public welfare and public policy are p
against private interests.”127 The ability of each Party to choo
arbitrator is also a significant difference between domestic courts an
arbitration process.128 Tribunal members appointed to adjudicate dis
generally tend to have a commercial law background, leadi
concerns that arbitrators may lack the necessary expertise to consid
broader public policy implications that arise in the context of Chapt
claims.129 Moreover, tribunal members are required to inter
Article 102: Objectives 
1. The objectives of this Agreement . . . are to:
a) eliminate barriers to trade in, and facilitate the cross-b
movement of, goods and services between the territories of the P
b) promote conditions of fair competition in the free trade area;
c) increase substantially investment opportunities in the territor
the Parties; 
d) provide adequate and effective protection and enforcem
intellectua
e) create effective procedures for the implementation and applicatio
of this Agreement, for its joint administration and for the resolu
f) establish a framework for further trilateral, regional and multilatera
cooperation to expand and enhance the benefits of this Agreement.130
hapter 11 is biased in favour of the co
 1125. 
127 MANN, supra note 111, at 38-39. 
128 Id.
129 Id. at 39. 
130 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 102. 
126 NAFTA, supra note 1, art.
20
Golden Gate University Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/gguelj/vol7/iss1/4
2013] SEEKING A REGULATORY CHILL IN CANADA 25
s as 
public
large
 and 
rally, as 
tru ”132
asures
 areas 
articipation in tribunals, and observation 
of tribunal proceedings) as
ssion 
 11 
ic all 
nals,
e also 
he interpretation of minimum standard of 
ssed 
with
r non-disputing party participation, 
uting
x In 2003 and 2004, NAFTA parties also committed to 
investors.131 One scholar described the context of these reform
follows: “[T]he three NAFTA governments have accepted the 
interest arguments that lawsuits against our governments involving 
sums of public money, which also concern public regulations
government decisions, may not be treated the same, procedu
ly private merely commercial disputes between corporate actors.
Reform efforts of the NAFTA governments have included me
related to improving public access to Chapter 11 tribunals in three
(access to tribunal documents, p
follows:
x In August 2001, the NAFTA Free Trade Commi
(FTC) issued Notes of Interpretation on Chapter
committing NAFTA governments to make publ
documents submitted to or issued by Chapter 11 tribu
except in limited circumstances.133 This FTC guidanc
addressed t
treatment to be accorded foreign investors (as discu
further below).
x In October 2004, the FTC issued a statement 
recommendations fo
which gives explicit support for admitting non-disp
parties as amici curiae.134
making NAFTA arbitrations open to the public.135
131 Charles H. Brower, II, Structure, Legitimacy, and NAFTA's Investment Chapter, 36 VAND.
J. T
RPORATE
ON NON-
at
nounces 
ice/press-
ICE OF 
NT—“A
at
ommiss
T. FOR 
 ON 
NAFTA’S CHAPTER 11: NEVER-NEVER LAND OR REAL PROGRESS? 3 (2003), available at 
www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/trade_ftc_comment_oct03.pdf. Mann notes that the statements released 
separately by the U.S. and Canada are not binding on Tribunals. Previous Tribunals, including the 
Methanex tribunal, have ruled that without the arbitrating parties consent the process cannot be open 
RANSNAT'L L. 37, 48 (2003). 
132 MICHELLE SWENARCHUK, THE NAFTA INVESTMENT CHAPTER: EXTREME CO
RIGHTS 5 (June 11, 2003), available at s.cela.ca/files/uploads/451nafta.pdf.
133 NOTES OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 115. 
134 NAFTA FREE TRADE COMM’N, STATEMENT OF THE FREE TRADE COMMISSION 
DISPUTING PARTY PARTICIPATION (Oct. 2004), available 
www.naftaclaims.com/Papers/Nondisputing-en.pdf [hereinafter FTC STATEMENT]. 
135 Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, NAFTA Commission An
New Transparency Measures (Oct. 7, 2003), available at www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-off
releases/archives/2003/october/nafta-commission-announces-new-transparen; see also OFF
THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, NAFTA FREE TRADE COMMISSION JOINT STATEME
DECADE OF ACHIEVEMENT” (July 16, 2004), available 
www.ustr.gov/archive/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2004/July/NAFTA_Free_Trade_C
ion_Joint_Statement_-_A_Decade_of_Achievement.html; HOWARD MANN, INT’L INS
SUSTAINABLE DEV., THE FREE TRADE COMMISSION STATEMENTS OF OCTOBER 7, 2003,
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These reforms have unevenly improved the situation by removing, 
to some extent, the shroud of secrecy surrounding NAFTA tribunal 
The second of these reforms, the FTC interpretative stateme
Chapter 11,136 provides guidance on when a tribunal is empowere
accept an amicus curie submission. These include whether
submissions would truly assist the tribunal in reaching a dec
whether the submission would address matters within the scope 
dispute, whether the amicus has demonstrated a significa
spute, and whether there is a public interest in the dispute.137
Reform efforts have also occurred within the ICSID,138
resulted in the adoption of Arbitration Rules on transparency and am
submissions in 2006.139 Under the UNCITRAL and other rules
tribunal’s power to accept amicus briefs is part of a more ge
discretion to conduct the proceeding as it deems appropriate in ord
do justice in each instance.140 The UNCITRAL Working Grou
Arbitration and Conciliation is preparing a legal standard
transparency for inclusion in its rules, rather than merely 
guidelines.141 This standard aims to make important information
documents available early in t
ld in public where possible, and to allow third parties to 
submissions in the proceedings.142
to o NAFTA could create a legally binding requirement for
arb e open to the public. Such a legal requirement is different from acceptance of amicus
bri  at 3. 
bitration
les at 
 at 
ics
ART TWO 
at
0LG.pdf
iliation)
daccess-
Working 
the public. Only an amendment t
itrations to b
efs, which a tribunal can do without the consent of either or both the arbitrating parties. Id.
136 FTC STATEMENT, supra note 134. 
137 Id. ¶ B6. 
138 Ignacio Torterola, The Transparency Requirement in the New UNCITRAL Ar
Ru : A Premonitory View, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS, Sept. 23, 2010, available 
www.iisd.org/itn/2010/09/23/the-transparency-requirement-in-the-new-uncitral-arbitration-rules-a-
premonitory-view/. 
139 INT’L CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, ICSID CONVENTION, REGULATION
AND RULES 115, 117, 122 (Apr. 2006), available
id.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf. 
140 ADVOCATES FOR INT’L DEV., AMICUS CURIAE & INVESTMENT ARBITRATIONS: P
4 (Feb. 29, 2012), available
a4id.org/sites/default/files/user/Amicus%20Curiae%20Legal%20Guide%20Part%20Two%2
141 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Rep. of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conc
On Its 58th Sess., Feb. 4, 2013-Feb. 8, 2013, ¶¶ 15-94, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/765, available at 
dds n.org/doc/UN O / EN/ 1380819.pdf?OpenElement. The -ny.u D C G V13/808/19/PDF/V
Grou  transparency and produced a revised draft of p has completed its third reading of the rules on
the rules on transparency of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. Under Articles 3, 4 and 6, the new 
rules require an arbitral tribunal, subject to certain conditions, to make documents available to the 
public, facilitate public access to hearings, and allow the participation of third persons. 
142 ADVOCATES FOR INT’L DEV., supra note 140, at 6. 
22
Golden Gate University Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/gguelj/vol7/iss1/4
2013] SEEKING A REGULATORY CHILL IN CANADA 27
allow 
 This 
e FTC 
ns  concerning procedures for the participation of non-
di
as in 
step 
nals 
nder
nd in 
These 
Gold,
t was 
lic to 
 on a 
ill be 
o the
line
ritten
ns of 
Commentators note that in order to allow a full hearing, including 
public interest issues, there should be a requirement for panels to accept 
proceedings. However, tribunals maintain broad discretion to 
greater public access including whether to accept amicus briefs.
discretion remains notwithstanding ICSID Rule 37(2)143 or th
recommendatio 144
sputing parties. 
The first amicus brief accepted by a NAFTA tribunal w
Methanex v. U.S. in 2001, a case that provided an important first 
towards increasing transparency and access to NAFTA tribunal
proceedings.145 Since Methanex, there have been four NAFTA tribu
that addressed amicus curiae applications, all operating u
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules146 as well as applying the criteria fou
the FTC statement on non-disputing party participation.147
included tribunals in Merrill & Ring Forestry v. Canada; Glamis 
Ltd. v. U.S.; Grand River Enterprises Six Nations v. U.S.; and Apotex v.
United States. In all but one, Apotex v. U.S., the amicus reques
denied.148
While there is now a well-established precedent for the pub
participate in Chapter 11 arbitration through the amicus process, this
right remains subject to the discretion of the panel and is determined
case-by-case basis.149 Moreover, the extent to which the public w
able to gain complete access to documents filed by the Parties t
arbitration proceedings is unclear. To date, there is no formal guide
governing the amicus process beyond the brief FTC statement noting
recommendations for tribunal procedures in accepting w
submissions and the ICSID Arbitration Rule 37 regarding submissio
non-disputing parties.150
143 INT’L CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, supra note 139, at 117. 
144 FTC STATEMENT, supra note 134. 
E FINAL 
13 (Aug. 
g/pdf/2005/commentary_methanex.pdf; see also FTC STATEMENT,
su
(AS
rbitration/arb-rules-
rev
148 Sarah Schadendorf, Human Rights Arguments in Amicus Curiae Submissions: Analysis of 
ICSID and NAFTA Investor-State Arbitrations, 1 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 1, 6 (2013). 
149 FTC STATEMENT, supra note 134, ¶¶ A1, B6. 
150 MANN, supra note 111, at 45; see also FTC STATEMENT, supra note 134. 
145 HOWARD MANN, INT’L CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, TH
DECISION IN METHANEX V. UNITED STATES: SOME NEW WINE IN SOME NEW BOTTLES 11-
2005), available at www.iisd.or
pra note 134. 
146 UNITED NATIONS COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES
REVISED IN 2010) (2011), available at www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/a
ised/arb-rules-revised-2010-e.pdf. 
147 FTC STATEMENT, supra note 134. 
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amicus curiae submissions.151 As well, in order to achieve g
consistency than that currently provided by the NAFTA ad hoc trib
it has long been suggested, though not acted upon, that a perm
review panel be established.152 This review panel would specialize 
construction and interpre 153tation of NAFTA provisions  and provide 
bi
ed the 
dings
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dings 
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ue to 
lustrated by the 
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ar to 
ent and public 
he 1114, 
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e that 
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5 The 
 the 
[liberalizing goals] in a manner consistent with environmental protection 
an public
nding precedents.154
Overall, these reforms, and suggested reforms, have not chang
fact that public participation in the Chapter 11 arbitration procee
remains generally limited to the filing of amicus curiae briefs,
discretion of the tribunal, in contrast to broader rights and procee
available before domestic courts. Nor have these reforms change
fact that public interest, environmental, and health measures contin
be targeted by foreign investors under Chapter 11, as il
Dow claim and other similar claims, as summarized in Table 1. 
Chapter 11 Overrides Environment and Health Measures in NA
Despite the fact that NAFTA contains provisions that appe
ensure a government’s ability to protect the environm
alth, namely within NAFTA’s preamble and Articles 1101 and 
these are trumped by other provisions to protect investor rights. 
Moreover, NAFTA provisions must be interpreted accordi
relevant international law rules of treaty interpretation as elaborat
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. These rules requir
when interpreting the substantive provisions of treaties, like NA
one must consider the object and purpose of the treaty, which in the case 
of NAFTA are purely commercial, as well as the treaty’s context.15
NAFTA preamble, having less legal force than the body of
agreement, includes resolutions to “undertake each of the preceding 
d conservation; preserve their flexibility to safeguard the 
nvestor-
DAVIS 
151 Stephen J. Byrnes, Balancing Investor Rights and Environmental Protection in I
State Dispute Settlement Under CAFTA: Lessons from the NAFTA Legitimacy Crisis, 8 U.C.
BUS. L.J. 103, 127 (2007). 
152 Id. at 103. 
153 INT’L CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS OF THE
FRAMEWORK FOR ICSID ARBITRATION, Annex, at 3 (Oct. 22, 2004), available at 
ics ViewAnnid. requestType=ICSIDPublicationsRH&actionVal=worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?
ounc SID appellate ePDF&AnnouncementType=archive&AnnounceNo=14_1.pdf (stating that an IC
body would have to be composed of “persons of recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise 
in law, international investment and investment treaties.”). 
154 Id.; see also Byrnes, supra note 151. 
155 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 115 U.N.T.S. 331. 
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 application of other 
Chapter 11 substantive rights, provided for in Articles 1105 and 1110, 
measures.
3.
laims 
e if a 
ision
1105,
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cess, 
161 In 
short, Article 1105 is meant to protect an international investment from 
ar asures.162 Legitimate investor expectations are 
welfare; promote sustainable development; [and] strengthen 
velopment and enforcement of environmental laws and regulations.”
NAFTA also contains Non-Precluded Measures clauses in A
1101(4) for public health measures and in 1114(1) for environm
protection measures. These articles carve out any “measu
appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken
in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns”157 from liability. 
scholar notes that Article 1114 “explicitly reserves each nat
sovereign right to adopt laws or policies of general appli
controlling or regulati gn  or restricting investments so as to preserve or 
protect the environment.”158
However, in order to benefit from these provisions’ protectio
measures must be “otherwise consistent with this Chapter [11].”15
result, Articles 1101 and 1114 have not effectively shielded many public
interest measures, nor deterred investors from bringing claims. Rath
discussed further below, the interpretation and
can threaten environmental and public health 
 Minimum Standard of Treatment—Article 1105 
Investors’ legitimate expectations are incorporated into their C
for Arbitration and are considered by NAFTA tribunals to determin
measure meets the Chapter 11 minimum standard of treatment prov
found in Article 1105.160 The legal test established for Article 
although vague and not easily definable, broadly requires determ
whether a government measure was developed according to due pro
with transparency, in good faith, and according to natural justice.
bitrary government me
156 NAFTA, supra note 1, pmbl. 
n Under 
114(1).
FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT STANDARD IN THE 
is Gold, 
able at
com/documents/Glamis_Award.pdf. 
161 See Glamis Gold, Ltd., Award. 
162 Ari Afilalo, Meaning, Ambiguity and Legitimacy: Judicial (Re-)Construction of NAFTA 
Chapter 11, 25 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 279, 287 (2005); see also NOTES OF INTERPRETATION, supra
note 115. 
157 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1114(1). 
158 Sanford E. Gaines, Environmental Policy Implications of Investor-State Arbitratio
NAFTA Chapter 11, 7 INT’L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS: POL., L., ECON.171, 175 (2007). 
159 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1
160 IOANA TUDOR, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 37, 165-69 (May 11, 2008); see also Glam
Ltd. v. United States, NAFTA/ICSID, Award, ¶ 561 (June 8, 2009), avail
italaw.
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oes the investor consider the 
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tor consider the measure to be reasonable.164
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 other 
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d an 
indirect expropriation if it results from bona fide regulation within the 
regulatory f economic injury results.166 To 
determ direct
an element of this legal test.163 These expectations also inform the
x How stable and predictable d
host party’s legal framework to be; 
x Does the in
discriminatory; 
x Does the investor consider the measure to have bee
place with transparency and procedural fairness; and 
x Does the inves
 Expropriation—Article 1110 
NAFTA’s Chapter 11 expropriation provision in Article 
anticipates the possibility that government action could be tantamou
direct expropriation, where government takes possession of p
property in exchange for compensation. The provision provide
governments are allowed to expropriate an investment only: (a) 
public purpose, (b) on a non-discriminatory basis, (c) in accordance
due process of law an
mpensation.165 If these criteria are not met, an investor will ha
right to claim compensation. 
The expropriation provision covers both direct and in
expropriation. Direct expropriation occurs when the government
possession of private property in exchange for compensation. In
expropriation is generally accepted by international investment trib
such as those established under Chapter 11, to occur when regul
have the effect of substantially reducing the value of property. In
words, the effect of indirect expropriation is considered similar t
effect of a direct expropriation. However, a measure is not considere
 powers of a state, even i
ine whether a general measure amounts to an in
¶¶ 619-22. 
tal and 
41 
00), available at
italaw.com/documents/SDMeyers-1stPartialAward.pdf; see also Methanex v. U.S., 
UNCITRAL/NAFTA, Amended Statement of Defense of the Respondent United States of America, 
¶¶ 410-11 (Dec. 5, 2003), available at
naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Methanex/MethanexSuppStatementOfDefenseAmend.pdf. 
163 See Glamis Gold, Ltd., Award, 
164 TUDOR, supra note 160; see also Rahim Moloo & Justin Jacinto, Environmen
Health Regulation: Assessing Liability Under Investment Treaties, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1, 39-
(2011). 
165 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1110(1). 
166 S.D. Meyers, Inc. v. Gov’t of Can., Partial Award, ¶ 281 (Nov. 13, 20
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A  re-evaluation of the pesticide to be a legitimate 
170
B
ticide 
expropriation requires consideration of the degree of interference
the investment, the purpose of the measure, and the investor’s 
pectations in relation to the use and enjoyment of its investment.167
In regards to an investors’ legitimate expectation, the jurispru
on Article 1110 suggests that an investor should expect a host st
adopt legitimate and proportionate regulatory measures in the ge
public’s interest.168 In addition, a tribunal will also take sp
commitments made by a government to an investor into account in its 
determination of investor expectations.169 For example, Dow consid
the Government of Québec’s commitment to review its 2,4-D ban in 
of PMR ’s
expectation.
. OVERVIEW OF DOW’S CLAIM
Following the Supreme Court decision in Hudson as pes
bylaws proliferated across Canada and both Québec and O
considered enacting provincial statutes, environmental organizatio
ntario
ns in 
Québec and Ontario heard persistent rumours of a possible NA
challenge.
FTA
incial 
w the 
assed 
s new 
 c uld be 
developed, the crucial details of which were the subject of active debate, 
notabl mately be included in the ban.175
171 Such a challenge came in 2008 against Québec’s prov
ban,172 three months after PMRA finalized its decision to allo
continued registration of 2,4-D,173 and two months after Ontario p
legislation to ban cosmetic pesticide use province-wide.174 Ontario’
law would not come into force until implementing regulations o
y about what pesticides would ulti
167 Moloo & Jacinto, supra note 164, at 19,
168
 21, 24. 
RB/05/8,
iles/case-
on, ¶ 9
: Gideon 
rly with 
ierra Club of Canada; Lisa Gue, David Suzuki Foundation; William Amos, Ecojustice; Rich 
Wa baux, Equiterre. 
/UNCITRAL, Notice of Intent To Submit a 
ug. 25, 
.
173 HEALTH CANADA PEST MGMT. REGULATORY AGENCY, supra note 96. 
174 Pesticides Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.11, art. 7.1 (Can.). 
175 Pesticides Act, R.O. 63/09, art. 4(5), 16 (Can.); ONTARIO MINISTRY OF THE ENV’T, supra
note 93. 
 Id. at 24; see also Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Rep. of Lith., ICSID Case No. A
Award (Sept. 11, 2007), available at www.italaw.com/sites/default/f
documents/ita0619.pdf. 
169 Moloo & Jacinto, supra note 164, at 24-25. 
170 Dow AgroSciences v. Gov’t of Can., NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Notice of Arbitrati
(Mar. 31, 2009). 
171 Personal communication between the author, Kathleen Cooper, and the following
Foreman, Canadian Association of Physicians for the Environment; Angela Rickman, forme
the S
ite, formerly with the Toronto Environmental Alliance; and Sidney Ri
172 Dow AgroSciences v. Gov’t of Can., NAFTA
Claim to Arbitration Under Chapter Eleven of the North American Trade Agreement (A
2008)
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In August 2008, Dow filed a Notice of Intent to Submit a Cla
Arbitration, on its own behalf and on behalf of its Canadian subsi
against the Government of Canada under Chapter 11.176 The Notice of 
Intent sought $2 million from the Government of Canada as well as 
“further relief including additional damages,”177 to compensate for 
alleged losses caused by the Government of Québec’s ban on the sale 
and use of pesticides containing 2,4-D, on lawns other than golf 
courses.178
Dow’s Notice of Arbitration179 followed in March 2009 and sought, 
pursuant to NAFTA’s Article 1135(b),180 “by way of restitution (a) the 
repeal of the Ban; and (b) such damages, costs, interest, amounts for tax 
consequences . . . resulting from Canada’s breaches which cannot
adequately be compensated by restitution.”181 Dow further claimed,
alternatively, pursuant to Article 1135(a), “an award in the amount of at 
least two million dollars for damages caused by Canada’s breaches of its
obligation under Chapter 11 NAFTA for, but without limitation, loss of 
sales, profits, goodwill, investment and other costs related to the 
pr  legal oducts”182 and further costs associated with, among other things,
representation, expert fees, and tax consequences.183
With these two claims, the Notice of Arbitration made a peculiar 
distinction between Article 1135(a) and 1135(b), seeking first the repeal 
of the ban as well as monetary damages pursuant to Article 1135(b) and, 
in the alternative, a monetary award of compensation pursuant to Article 
1135(a).184 However, in the entirety of Article 1135, the only remedies 
available for investors are monetary damages and any applicabl  ine terest 
under Article 1135(a),185 and restitution of property, again, in the form of 
monetary y applicable interest under Article 1135 (b).186 damages, and an
Nowhere is t e outlined as an available remedy. he repeal of a measur
176 Dow AgroSciences, Notice of Intent. 
177 Id. ¶ 60(f). 
178 Dow AgroSciences v. Gov’t of Can., NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Notice of Arbitration, ¶ 17
(Mar. 31, 2009). Environmental organizations saw the small amount of money claimed by Dow as 
an cacy device to try to scare off Ontario and other indication of the NAFTA claim service as an advo
pro See Press Release, Canadian Envtl. Law Ass’n, Cosmetic vinces from cosmetic pesticide bans.
Pe c Deal (May 30, 2011), available atsticide Bans Unaffected by DOW-Québe
ww sevents/media-release/cosmetic-pesticide-bans-unaffected-dow-quebec-deal. 
ciences, Notice of Arbitration. 
pra note 1, art. 1135(1). 
rbitration, ¶ 55. 
183 Id. ¶ 56(b)-(e). 
184 Id. ¶ 56(a)-(e).
185 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1135(a). 
186 Id. art. 1135(b). 
w.cela.ca/new
179 Dow AgroS
180 NAFTA, su
181 Dow AgroSciences, Notice of A
182 Id. ¶ 56(a). 
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Substantive reasons for the claim as spelled out in the Notice of 
Arbitration supported Dow’s overall claim that Canada, due to the 
actions of Québec, was in breach of two NAFTA obligations contained
in Chapter 11187 and as such “as a party to NAFTA, Canada is 
responsible for the NAFTA-inconsistent conduct of Québec.”188 Dow 
further proposed that three arbitrators be appointed and that the 
arbitration take place in Ottawa, Ontario.189
The foundation of Dow’s concerns was that the Québec ban on 2,4-
D had been adopted and maintained notwithstanding two key admissions 
by the government of Québec. First, documents obtained by Dow via 
Freedom of Information (FOI) requests included statements by Québec 
government officials that the ban on 2,4-D could not be scientifically 
defended. Rather, these officials noted that the ban should rest instead on 
“less firm grounds” such as the precautionary principle or a policy 
decision resulting from the will of the population (similar to an existing
Québec Forest Protection Strategy that prohibited use of chemical
pesticides).190 Dow stated that “these [FOI] documents make clear that 
Québec recognized the absence of a scientific basis for its ban on 2,4-D. 
Moreover, even its stated reliance on an interpretation of the 
pr atherecautionary approach was motivated by political considerations, r
than any legitimate scientific concerns.”191
The second admission, according to Dow, was that the FOI 
documents obtained indicated that due to the scientific uncertainty 
concerning the toxicity of 2,4-D, Québec officials intended to review the 
ban on 2,4-D in light of the results of ongoing reviews by regulatory 
agencies in Canada and the United States.192
In 2005 and 2008, following prevailing risk assessment practices,
the EPA193 and the PMRA194 concluded that insufficient evidence 
existed to consider 2,4-D to be a cancer risk. More generally, these two
agencies made an overall finding that the continued use of this pesticide 
was an acceptable risk. Dow cited the PMRA conclusions and noted they 
were in accord with similar findings made in the late 1990s and early 
2000s b nd expert review panels in the y other regulatory agencies a
United States, New Zealand, and within the World Health
AgroSciences, Notice of Arbitration, ¶¶ 8-9. 
191 Id. ¶ 25. 
192 Id. ¶¶ 26-29, 41. 
193 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 99. 
194 HEALTH CANADA PEST MGMT. REGULATORY AGENCY, supra note 96. 
187 Dow
188 Id. ¶ 7. 
189 Id. ¶ 57. 
190 Id. ¶¶ 22-24. 
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Organization.195 Dow further claimed that, despite these most recent 
conclusions of the PMRA and the EPA, Québec “has also failed to act in 
accordance with its earlier commitments to review the Ban following the 
re-evaluation of 2,4-D.”196
First, the specific claimed breaches of NAFTA obligations were 
with respect to the provisions of Article 1105.197 Canada was accused of 
failing to treat Dow “in accordance with international law, including fair
and equitable treatment and full protection and security.”198 Further, 
Dow claimed that Article 1105 was individually and cumulatively
breached by Québec’s actions “in improperly imposing the Ban, in 
failing and refusing to review and repeal the Ban, in breaching the 
Claimant’s legitimate expectations, in conducting biased and improper 
reviews and advancing improper conclusions, and in prohibiting the sale 
and use of 2,4-D.”199 Further, Dow maintained that Canada was “in 
breach of international law and its obligations under Article 1105 in 
respect of basic due process, transparency, good faith and natural
justice.”200
The second claimed breach was with provisions of Article 1110.201
Dow claimed that the effect of Québec’s actions from 2003 to 2009, 
individually and cumulatively, amounted to measures tantamount to 
expropriation of Dow’s investment.202 Citing Article 1110, Dow noted 
that such measures could be justified “only if they are: for a public
purpose; on a non-discriminatory basis; in accordance with due process
and Article 1105(1); and on payment of compensation on a prescribed
basis.”203 Dow stated that none of these criteria had been met by 
Québec—“most particularly, no compensation has ever be ne  paid or 
offered”204—and thus Canada was in breach of Article 1110 obligations 
to avoid direct or indirect expropriation of an investor, except in 
accordance with the four criteria listed in Article 1110, noted above.205
 ¶¶ 31-32, 34. 
5.
, ¶ 47. 
A, supra note 1, art. 1110(a). 
202 Dow AgroSciences, Notice of Arbitration, ¶50. 
203 Id. ¶ 51. 
204 Id. ¶ 52. 
205 Id. ¶ 53. 
195 AgroSciences, Notice of Arbitration,Dow
196 Id. ¶ 46.
197 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 110
198 Dow AgroSciences, Notice of Arbitration
199 Id. ¶ 48.
200 Id. ¶ 49.
201 NAFT
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C. INITIAL REACTIONS FROM NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
AND POLITICIANS
 with 
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deral
Trade 
, this 
urred
ment 
 case 
der to 
n the 
g a 
tario,
tively
s one 
d “as 
much at deterring other governments from taking similar steps to reduce 
pesticide use for health and environmental reasons, as much as it [was] 
meant to 
Public interest environmental and health organizations reacted
dismay to Dow’s Notice of Intent and later the Notice of Arbitration
called on the federal government, specifically the Minister
International Trade, to vigorously defend Québec’s law,
acknowledge the appropriate precautionary basis for Québec’s actio
Specifically, these organizations asserted that non-discrimin
regulatory measures for a public purpose in accordance with due pro
are not, under international law, expropriations or violations of
minimum standard of treatment rules and thus not subjec
compensation.207 The organizations further called on the fe
government to ensure more robust applications of the precauti
principle in PMRA risk assessments of pesticides.208
As a result of public interest groups raising this issue with fe
politicians, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on International 
took up the matter. Prior to the Notice of Arbitration being filed
committee recommended to the Canadian Parliament, which conc
with the statement later in the same year, “that the Govern
vigorously defend Québec’s Pesticides Management Code in the
opposing Dow Agroscience and the Government of Canada in or
safeguard Québec’s right to enact legislation and make regulations i
public interest.”209
Dow’s action was widely perceived as an attempt to brin
regulatory chill on efforts across Canada, particularly in On
Canada’s most populous province with a government ac
considering a sweeping ban on hundreds of pesticide products. A
legal commentator observed, the claim by Dow appeared to be aime
win compensation of $2 million, as claimed, for the incidental
ID SUZUKI FOUND. ET AL., BRIEFING NOTE: POTENTIAL NAFTA CHALLENGE TO 
QU AN OF 2, 4-D LAWN PESTICIDES 1 (Apr. 9, 2009), available at
ww lish-
. at 1. 
209 CANADA HOUSE OF COMMONS STANDING COMM. ON INT’L TRADE, REPORT 2—CHAPTER
11 OF THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (NAFTA) (Mar. 31, 2009), available at
www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=3787580&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl
=40&Ses=2. 
206 DAV
ÉBEC’S B
w.ecojustice.ca/media-centre/media-backgrounder/Dow%2024-D%20Backgrounder-Eng
2009-04-09%20_WA_.pdf/at_download/file. 
207 Id. at 1. 
208 Id
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 full 
protection and security.”  The provision has been broadly interpreted to 
require that government measures will be developed with due process, 
tra 216
impacts on Dow’s sales in Québec.”210
However, when asked in 2008 about a NAFTA challenge to the 
Ontario law, then-Environment Minister John Gerretsen 
unconcerned. Referring to the legal research done by lawyers wi
Ontario Ministry of Environment confirming the validity of prov
autho
.”211
There were, of course, legitimate concerns given the fact that
claims have been particularly threatening to environmental and 
public welfare measures, as summarized in Table 1. However,
Ontario Environment Minister’s reaction was a direct resu
confidence in a multi-year process by a soph
modern democracy to develop a highly popular law. 
OTIONS
IRONIC CONSEQUENCES
As noted above, ISDS mechanisms originated in agree
between developed and less developed nations to provide measures
would protect investors from unfair or arbitrary action by countries
less developed judicial systems.212 The unexpected and 
consequence of including such mechanisms in NAFTA has be
undermine domestic public interest regulation using a dispute reso
mechanism that denies the public the procedural fairness that exi
their modern judicial system.213 This consequence is largely due 
narrow purview of NAFTA, with its overall objectives focused on 
and the paramount importance assigned to investor rights by the ter
Chapter 11.214
Article 1105 speaks to the obligation of a Party “to acco
investments of investors of another Party treatment in accordance
international law, including fair and equitable treatment and
215
n nd according to natural justice.  These aresparency, in good faith, a
 Minister of Env’t for Ontario, at a meeting of health 
an leen Cooper (Oct. 2008) (on file with authors). 
6.
213 MANN, supra note 111, at 37-46; see infra Table 1. 
214 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 102, ch.11. 
215 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1105(1). 
216 TUDOR, supra note 160, at 37. 
210 Van Harten, supra note 124, at 43. 
211 Communication from John Gerretsen,
d environmental organizations to Kath
212 Price, supra note 118, at 3
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oader
public input as compared to that available under the Canadian legislative 
and judicial system. Thus, Article 1110, like Article 1105, provides far 
gr mmercial expectations as 
indeed important and valid principles derived from the rule of law, which 
has defined the legal framework of democratic governments. As 
these expectations similarly constitute a minimum standard of trea
that Canadians or the citizens of any other modern democracy have 
to expect from their lawmakers and their courts. However, 
NAFTA, the application of these principles has tended to be conside
narrowed in the context of a dispute over the minimum standa
treatment, where the focus has largely been confined to matters of
and investment. In the Dow example, this narrow focus is on lost sales of
a single pesticide by a single company. 
This narrow lens can ignore the due process that was provided 
Canadian public on the broader, but directly related, issue of cos
pesticide bans. As described above,217 a significant amount of suc
process accorded to the public occurred in a transparent fashion, during 
more than fifteen years of efforts at the level of local and prov
governments in Québec, in the Québec Courts, and at the Supreme 
of Canada, not to mention similar extensive activity elsewhere in C
either by municipal or provincial governments or in the Ontario cou
is also important to note that as specific by-laws were developed
became the subject of legal challenges, the due process that was pro
under Canada’s legislative and judicial systems stands in sharp co
to the NAFTA arbitration proc se s, which has largely been cloaked in 
secrecy and where public participation, when it is allowed, lack
aspects of basic procedural fairness.218
Similarly, Article 1110 provides that regulatory measures en
by a government must be for a public purpose through the due proc
law and applied without discrimination.219 Otherwise, the measure
give rise to investor claims for compensation if it results in expropri
or is tantamount to expropriation. Here again, despite many years o
process, a tribunal operating within the narrow objectives of NAF
trade focus would make the determination as to whether Qué
pesticide ban amounts to expropriation.220 As noted above, memb
these tribunals have expertise that rarely extends beyond comm
law. Further, their proceedings provide limited opportunity for br
ea on the investor’s legitimate coter emphasis 
217 See supra Part II. 
218 See discussion supra Part II, III.A.1-2. 
219 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1110. 
220 See discussion supra Part III.A.1. 
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ocess
 they 
would
uting
er. The groups 
noted that this was in sharp contrast with the rules of practice for 
Court of 
Canada.225
opposed to the public’s legitimate expectations that their gover
ill enact environmental measures to protect their welfare.221
Equiterre, a Québec-based environmental group, and the D
Suzuki Foundation, a Canadian environmental organization bas
Vancouver, British Columbia, expressed these concerns in respon
Dow’s Notice of Arbitration.222 They announced their intention to
joint amicus curiae submission once a tribunal was establish
However, both groups expressed concerns that even in cases su
Dow, where “matters of the public interest are engaged, NAFTA C
11 only guarantees legal standing to eligible investors, leaving other civil 
society actors to engage in a limited fashion (in writing only) 
discretion of the arbitrators.”224 Given how the amicus curiae pr
has developed in Chapter 11 case law, the organizations claimed
had no confidence that even when the panel was established, it 
have the discretion to benefit from oral submissions from non-disp
parties with a distinct interest and expertise in the matt
intervention before domestic courts such as the Supreme 
E. THE MAIN STICKING POINT: PRECAUTIONARY DECISIONMAKI
As described above, Dow’s Notice of Arbitration focused o
contention that Québec had no scientific basis to impose a ban on 2
and had acknowledged as much.
NG
n the 
,4-D,
ion of 
e of a 
on an 
litical
More specifically, Dow pointed to a 2003 Methodology Report228
used b
by 
226 According to Dow’s interpretat
Québec government documentation, Québec recognized the absenc
scientific basis for its ban on 2,4-D and “even its stated reliance 
interpretation of the precautionary approach was motivated by po
considerations, rather than any legitimate scientific concerns.”227
y the Québec government, which Dow claimed had not been made 
available for comment. As reviewed in the Briefing Note229 prepared 
Julie A. Soloway, Environmental Regulation as Expropriation: The Case of NAFTA's 
Ch AN. BUS. L.J. 92, 107-08 (2000). 
.
/UNCITRAL, Notice of Arbitration, ¶ 23-25
(Mar. 31, 2009). 
227 Id. ¶ 25. 
228 Id. ¶¶ 27-28. 
229 DAVID SUZUKI FOUND. ET AL., supra note 206, at 2. 
221
apter 11, 33 C
222 DAVID SUZUKI FOUND. ET AL., supra note 206. 
223 Id. at 2. 
224 Id.
225 Id. at 2-3
226 Dow AgroSciences v. Gov’t of Can., NAFTA
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European Union Strategy for Endocrine Disruptors had proposed that 
2,4-D be considered a Category II chemical on its priority list of 
su 235 a health outcome not 
environmental organizations, Québec applied what it referred 
science-based criteria to select pesticides for inclusion in the
namely, to include pesticides that are included on lists compil
internationally reputable sources as being suspected to cause cance
be associated with endocrine disruption although at the time suc
only existed for substances associated with cancer.230 Québec relied
the International Agency for Research on Cancer and its classificat
possible human carcinogens the group of chlorophenoxy herbic
which includes 2,4-D.231 Québec also admitted, as Dow spelled out
Notice of Arbitration,232 that insufficient data existed to assign
classification to individual substances within the group, but indicate
when the PMRA re-evaluation was complete, it would reconside
inclusion of 2,4-D in the ban. When the positive result of the feder
evaluation did not alter Québec’s ban on 2,4-D, Dow concluded that 
“Québec ha[s] failed to honour its commitment to re-evaluate the Ban, 
notwithstanding the completion of re-assessments subsequent to the
by both the PMRA and the EPA.”233
It can be concluded from a review of Dow’s arguments that a
assumption is being made that precautionary decisionmaking i
scientific. Further, when the Québec ban on 2,4-D was not reversed after
the PMRA and other regulatory agencies concluded that 
registration was acceptable, the arguments made in Dow’s Noti
Arbitration indicate that Dow clearly considered Québec’s 
commitment to review its ban was the same as agreeing to reverse it
In contrast, environmental organizations disputed the results o
PMRA’s risk assessment of 2,4-D. In this circumstance, these gr
note the ability of risk assessment to reach a conclusion as 
chemical’s acceptable risk on the basis of an incomplete considerati
potential health effects.234 For example, they pointed out tha
spected endocrine disrupting chemicals,
roposed
e Lawn and Turf 
Uses ,4-D] (Apr. 22, 2005), available at
230 Id. at 3-4. 
231 INT’L AGENCY FOR RESEARCH ON CANCER, supra note 82. 
232 Dow AgroSciences, Notice of Arbitration, ¶¶ 21-29. 
233 Id. ¶ 30. 
234 Letter from Canadian Envtl. Law Ass’n et al., to Pest Mgmt. Regulatory Agency, P
Ac bility for Co tinui g Regist 05-01: Re-Evaluation of thcepta  n n ration (PACR) 20
 of (2,4-Dichlorophenoxy) Acetic Acid [2
s.cela.ca/files/uploads/508_2_4_D.pdf; Press Release, Canadian Envtl. Law Ass’n, supra note 178;
see also Theresa McClenaghan et al., Environmental Standard Setting and Children’s Health: 
Injecting Precaution into Risk Assessment,12(2) J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 245, 249-54 (2003). 
235 DAVID SUZUKI FOUND. ET AL., supra note 206, at 3. 
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1. Based
Decisionmaking
cautionary 
considered in the PMRA risk assessment. Although the PMRA did
that evidence indicated possible endocrine disruption effects of 2
this evidence was not considered in the re-evaluation decision du
lack of validated test protocols.236 To this day, the complex
endocrine disruption science continues to challenge the developme
such test protocols.237 Regulatory agencies around the world contin
work towards establishing official lists of endocrine disru
substances.238 Where such lists are noted in scientific reviews a
endocrine disrupting substances, 2,4-D is included and od ne so 
context of calls for more precautionary decisionmaking abou
seriousness of effects related to endocrine disrupting chemicals.239
An extensive debate exists, as summarized below, about wh
the precautionary principle is unscientific.240 Closely related, an eq
extensive critique exists ch lenging the notion that chemical risk
assessment, as conducted by
a purely science-based exercise.241 Each of these debates is b
mmarized here. 
 Applying Precaution and Risk Assessment—Both Are Science-
Recognizing that there are various formulations of the pre
236 HEALTH CANADA PEST MGMT. REGULATORY AGENCY, supra note 96, at 22, 42-43. 
t ix, xv-
G RISK 
Triggers 
&
RG. FOR 
DOCRINE 
on the 
7/2013, at 6-8, 10, 
13- o?pubRef=-
//E GENCY,
-7 (June 
237 WORLD HEALTH ORG. & UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, supra note 23, a
xvii, 234-37; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND DECISIONS—ADVANCIN
ASSESSMENT 93-119 (2009). 
238 Laura M. Plunkett et al., An Enhanced Tiered Toxicity Testing Framework with 
for Assessing Hazards and Risks of Commodity Chemicals, 58 REG. TOXICOLOGY 
PHARMACOLOGY 382, 387 (2010); Robert J. Kavlock et al., Toxicity Testing in the 21st Century:
Implications for Human Health Risk Assessment, 29(4) RISK ANALYSIS 485, 487 (2009); O
ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., INFORMATION ON OECD WORK RELATED TO EN
DISRUPTORS (2012), available at www.oecd.org/env/ehs/testing/50067203.pdf; Report 
Protection of Public Health from Endocrine Disruptors, EUR. PARL. DOC. A7-002
14 (Jan. 28, 2013), available at www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.d
P//NONSGML+REPORT+A7-2013-0027+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. A
ENDOCRINE DISRUPTOR SCREENING PROGRAM COMPREHENSIVE MANAGEMENT PLAN 6
2012), available at www.epa.gov/endo/pubs/EDSP-comprehensive-management-plan.pdf.
239 WORLD HEALTH ORG. & UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, supra note 23, at 190. 
LIFE 
 section 
apter in 
lso Mark Geistfeld, Reconciling Cost-Benefit Analysis with the Principle that Safety 
Matters More than Money, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 114, 174-78 (2001). 
241 D. Santillo et al., The Precautionary Principle: Protecting Against Failures of Scientific 
Method and Risk Assessment, 36 MARINE POLLUTION BULL. 939, 941 (1998); McClenaghan et al.,
supra note 234. 
240 Theresa McClenaghan, Precautionary Principle, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF QUALITY OF 
AND WELL-BEING RESEARCH (Alex C. Michalos ed., forthcoming). Note that content in this
is drawn from parallel research and writing undertaken by Ms. McClenaghan for this ch
press. See a
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notion that chemical risk assessment, as conducted by the PMRA and 
other regulatory agencies, is a purely science-based exercise. The 
principle,242 the statement from the Rio Declaration on Environme
Development has been followed sufficiently often that for some, it 
most authoritative version.243 The Declaration states that “[i]n ord
protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely 
applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats 
of serious or irreversible damage, lack of scientific certainty shall not 
used as a reason for postponin
vironmental degradation.”244
Leaving aside the various critiques of this formulation,245
fundamentally about applying precaution when there is the potenti
serious harm to the environment or human health,246 and scie
uncertainty as to the extent of the harm or the causes of the har
“Uncertainty” in this context means more than speculation,248 a
about the extent of the harm, as well as causation.249 It is science-
because there must be a basis on which to conclude that a threat of
is serious and perhaps irreversible. While this latter point may con
to be disputed, within the precautionary principle debate,
is a tool for bringing science and policy together for eff
decisionmaking on difficult subjects where much is at stake.250
Closely related, an equally extensive critique exists challengin
rdens of 
G THE 
 eds., 1999). 
ATIONAL 
Precautionary 
ATION,
/.
ENTIFIC 
EDGE & TECH., THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 12 (Mar. 2005), available at 
un
utionary
89, 289-
Science,
65 (2000); Joel 
ting the 
L & ENVTL. HEALTH 281, 281 (2000). 
2006] NSWLEC 133, at ¶ 147-48, 204 (Austl.); see
WORLD COMM’N ON THE ETHICS OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE & TECH., supra note 245, at 31. 
249 See CAMERON & ABOUCHAR, supra note 63, at 20; Saladin, supra note 243, at 275; 
Telstra, NSWLEC 133, ¶ 140. 
250 See Santillo et al., supra note 241, at 941. 
242 Carl F. Cranor, Asymmetric Information, the Precautionary Principle, and Bu
Proof, in PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT: IMPLEMENTIN
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 75 (Carolyn Raffensperger & Joel Tickner
243 Claudia Saladin, Precautionary Principle in International Law, 6 INT’L J. OCCUP
& VTL. HEALTH 270, 271-73 (2000); John S. Applegate, The Taming of the EN
Principle, 27 WILLIAM & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 13, 13 (2002). 
244 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENV’T & DEV., U.N. AGENDA 21, RIO DECLAR
Principle 15, (reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992)), available at www.un.org/esa/dsd/agenda21
245 See Saladin, supra note 243, at 273; WORLD COMM’N ON THE ETHICS OF SCI
KNOWL
esdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001395/139578e.pdf. 
246 Gwynne Lyons et al., An Environmentalist’s Vision of Operationalizing the Preca
Principle in the Management of Chemicals, 6 INT’L J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. HEALTH 2
90 (2000). 
247 Carl Smith, The Precautionary Principle and Environmental Policy—
Uncertainty, and Sustainability, 6 INT’L J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. HEALTH 263, 2
A. Tickner & Polly Hoppin, Children’s Environmental Health: A Case Study in Implemen
Precautionary Principle, 6 INT’L J. OCCUPATIONA
248 Telstra v. Hornsby Shire Council [
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f the 
disputed the notion that the PMRA risk assessment result was purely 
sc on a 
limitations of risk assessment have been extensively described
x limits on criteria for the selection of hazards to assess;
x the practice
of knowledge; 
x the inability to factor 
additive or synergistic effects; 
x limits on the ability to quantify impacts; 
x the role of professional judgment to assess and/or fill data 
gaps;
x the limitations arising from health or other impact
points under consideration such as endocrine disrupti
other complex conditions involving complex dose-response 
and/or long latency periods, and lack of data about such
impacts
x lack of data about substances, processes, and ecosy
variables;
x tendency to make type II errors as a result of 
x potential for surprise in behaviour of systems and so on
In sum, the apparent “certainty” resulting from the expressi
risk assessment analytical results in quantitative terms is often illuso
The Dow Notice of Arbitration challenged the legitimacy o
precautionary principle as a basis for decisionmaking and claimed that 
the scientific result from the PMRA risk assessment was sufficient to 
reverse Québec’s unscientific decision. In contrast, environmental groups 
ientific, and supported Québec’s decision to retain its ban 
precautionary basis in light of ongoing scientific uncertainty. 
251 See tillo et al., supra note 241, at 941-48; Smith, supra note 247, at 264; David
et al., The Precautionary Principle in Environmental Science, 109 ENVTL. HEALTH PER
(2001); CANADIAN ENVTL. LAW ASS’N, IMPLEMENTING PRECAUTION: AN NGO RESPONSE
GOVERNMENT OF CANADA’S DISCUSSION DOCUMENT “A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE 
PRECAUTIONARY APPROACH/PRINCIPLE” 5 (Apr. 2002), available at
www.cela.ca/sites/cela.ca/files/uploads/419precautionary.pdf; WORLD COMM’N ON THE ETHICS OF 
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE & TECH., supra note 245, at 26 (additionally describing un
San  Kriebel 
SP. 871 
 TO THE 
ON THE 
expected 
ENVTL.
ENT AND HEALTH 11-46 
(June 26, 2003), available at
webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090128002317/http://www.rcep.org.uk/chreport.htm. 
252 In simple terms, Type II errors are those in which a causal association is missed, whereas 
Type I errors are those in which there is a mistaken finding of a causal association. 
outcomes and complex systems that may suddenly change state); ROYAL COMM’N ON
POLLUTION, CHEMICALS IN PRODUCTS: SAFEGUARDING THE ENVIRONM
38
Golden Gate University Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/gguelj/vol7/iss1/4
2013] SEEKING A REGULATORY CHILL IN CANADA 43
2. 
al, as 
bunal
 not 
ings.
er can be considered in light of other tribunal 
ru
 read 
 was 
This 
 the 
 and 
to be 
ether
ration
isions
ld to 
lines, 
often
255 This 
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n the 
to an 
expropriation of its investment.  In 1998, the Canadian government 
settled with Ethyl for $13 million.258 As part of the settlement, the 
entific
What Would a Tribunal Have Done? 
The Dow matter was settled without going before a tribun
discussed further below. It is speculative to consider what a tri
would have decided particularly given the fact that tribunals are
bound by the rules of precedent that apply in court proceed
Nevertheless, the matt
lings on similar matters. 
Dow’s Notice of Arbitration essentially asked the tribunal to
into Chapter 11 a requirement that a strict science-based test
necessary for regulations affecting sales of Dow’s products.253
interpretation flows from Dow’s legitimate expectations for
minimum standard of treatment provided for in Article 1105,
specifically, whether as an investor it considered a measure 
reasonable and not arbitrary, which in Dow’s opinion turned on wh
the Québec ban on 2,4-D had a scientific basis.254
The legitimate expectations of investors are a major conside
for NAFTA tribunals when applying the legal tests for the prov
relied upon by Dow. Legitimate expectations of investors are he
include measures based on scientific studies and international guide
not measures based on the precautionary principle, which is 
inaccurately conflated by NAFTA tribunals as a political basis.
focus on a scientific basis underlying the measures in dispute occur
the Ethyl and Chemtura cases, which preceded Dow. 
Ethyl Corp. v. Government of Canada involved a NAFTA in
claim concerning a chemical ban justified on the basis of healt
environmental risks. The case involved the chemical MMT,256 a gas
additive suspected of neurotoxicity. The claim called into questio
scientific basis of the ban, with Ethyl claiming the ban amounted 
257
Government of Canada publicly declared that there was no sci
ta/.
1; see also Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States,, 
Aw
ssure).
anese tricarbonyl. 
257 Ethyl Corp. v. Gov’t of Can., NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Statement of Claim, ¶¶ 19-50 (Oct.2, 
1997), available at www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/assets/pdfs/disp-diff/ethyl-04.pdf. 
258 See Gaines, supra note 158, at 183. 
253 Howard Mann, DOWning NAFTA?, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (May 2, 2009), available
at www.iisd.org/itn/2009/05/03/downing-naf
254 See Moloo & Jacinto, supra note 164, at 4
ard, ¶ 24 (June 8, 2009), available at italaw.com/documents/Glamis_Award.pdf. 
255 See Moloo & Jacinto, supra note 164, at 30, 33 (arguing that the precautionary measures in
the Ethyl claim were driven by political pre
256 Methylcyclopentadienyl mang
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tional
on to 
ment
and health measures be supported by a risk assessment or scientific 
st tment 
basis to prohibit MMT under Canadian federal law, and exp
acknowledged that “current scientific information fails to demon
that MMT impairs the proper functioning of automotive on-
diagnostic systems . . . and there is no scientific evidence to modi
conclusions drawn by Health Canada in 1994 that MMT poses no 
risk.”259 The unavailability of scientific evidence to support t
easure was a key factor in Canada’s decision to settle in Ethyl.260
Similarly, in 2010 Canada successfully defended against an inv
claim by Chemtura on scientific grounds. Chemtura’s claim was
based on alleged breaches of the minimum standard of treatment and 
expropriation provisions as a result of a ban on lindane, a pesticide
in the production of canola.261 The tribunal held that the governme
Canada’s scientific review of lindane “falls within acceptable scie
parameters,”262 but that it was “not for the Tribunal to revie
scientific basis of the PMRA’s decision.”263 As such, the Chemtur
cision is an example of adjudicators putting emphasis on the scie
process underlying the risk assessment and regulatory action. 
Although NAFTA’s text does not explicitly preclude a p
interest precautionary measure from being considered as a legit
measure, tribunals have not upheld such an interpretation. Rather,
have held such measures to be legitimate on the basis that they
supported by a scientific study, or by an established interna
guideline, rather than a precautionary approach.264 As the Interna
Institute of Sustainable Development argued in its amicus submissi
the tribunal in Methanex, Chapter 11 does not require that environ
udy.265 Rather, a breach of the minimum standard of trea
259 Press Release, Environment Canada, Government To Act on Agreement on Intern
(AIT) Panel Report on MMT (July 20, 1998) as cited in Gaines, supra note 158, at 183; see also Ken 
Traynor, How Canada Became Shill for Ethyl Corp
al Trade 
: NAFTA and the Erosion of Federal 
En  (Sept. 1998); GRACE WOOD & MARIKA EGYED,
RI GANESE 
94), available at 
publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/H46-1-34-1994E-1.pdf. 
oloo & Jacinto, supra note 164, at 29. 
able
; see also Methanex Corp. v. United States,
NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction & Merits, at Part II.D, 14 (Aug. 3, 
2002), available at www.state.gov/documents/organization/51052.pdf. 
265 Methanex Corp., NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Amicus Curiae Submissions ¶ 21 (Mar. 9, 2004), 
available at www.state.gov/documents/organization/30475.pdf. 
vironmental Protection, 23(3) THE INTERVENOR
SK ASSESSMENT FOR THE COMBUSTION PRODUCTS OF METHYLCYCLOPENTADIENYL MAN
TRICARBONYL (MMT) IN GASOLINE (Dec. 6, 19
260 See M
261 Chemtura Corp. v. Gov’t of Can., NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Award (Aug. 2 2010), avail
at www.worldcourts.com/pca/eng/decisions/2010.08.02_Chemtura_v_Canada.pdf. 
262 Id. ¶ 131. 
263 Id. ¶ 131. 
264 See Moloo & Jacinto, supra note 164, at 26-27
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provisions should simply involve an assessment of whether the measur
as taken arbitrarily.266
However, some international investment law specialists no
relation to the history of precautionary measures considered by NA
tribunals that “settlement is a good idea in expropriation claims 
governments base their measures on the precautionary principle, as
are more likely to trigger the requirement of comp
easure based on science evidencing a legitimate concern.”267
While tribunals have expected a demonstration of traditional 
scientific evidence and/or risk assessments to uphold the legitimacy of an 
environmental or health measure, there is in fact no express requirement 
in NAFTA to do so. As one scholar asserts, “[s]uch a test is simply not 
expressed in NAFTA or any other investment treaty, and would seriously 
constrain if not fully deny governments the ability to establish acceptable 
risk levels to human health and the environment based on the 
precautionary principle.”268
F.
ce of 
 was 
. The 
n the 
in the 
 that 
e of 
as a 
“full and final settlement,”274 the Government of Québec also 
ac ly restate the 
 STALEMATE: ALL SIDES CLAIM VICTORY
In May 2011, almost three years after Dow brought its Noti
Arbitration claim, no further filings occurred and a settlement
reached without the case proceeding before a NAFTA tribunal
Settlement Agreement269 refers to an exchange of letters betwee
Government of Canada and the Government of Québec where
parties agree to the terms of the Settlement Agreement,270 including
Québec’s ban on 2,4-D be upheld,271 the withdrawal of Dow’s Notic
Arbitration,272 and that no compensation be provided.273 As well 
knowledged several “agreed principles”275 that essential
266 See Afilalo, supra note 162; see als Moloo & Jacinto, supra note 164, at 54-55. o
FTA ON
GEMENT PROCESSES (Oct. 2000), available at 
www.iisd.org/pdf/2001/trade_mann_final.pdf. 
Dow AgroSciences v. Gov’t of Can., NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Settlement Agreement, ¶ 9 
(M 011), available at www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
co aux/assets/pdfs/disp-diff/dow-03.pdf. 
 1. 
.
272 Id. ¶ 2. 
273 Id.
274 Id. ¶ 3. 
275 Id.
267 See Moloo & Jacinto, supra note 164, at 30. 
268 Mann, supra note 253; see also HOWARD MANN, ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF NA
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND MANA
269
ay 25, 2
mmerci
270 Id. ¶
271 Id
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to regulate the use of 
pe ada’s
blicly
 most 
ective 
y
ould
 the 
ébec
n t and 
existing or future municipal or provincial pesticide bans are 
un  She further noted, “I am extremely happy no money was 
reality of the tri-level regulatory regime that exists in Canada to re
pesticid 276
Hudson.
The first principle includes the definition of “acceptable risk”
it is stated in the federal Pest Control Products Act. It then specifie
the Government of Québec acknowledge the results of this determin
of acceptable risk for 2,4-D in the 2008 PMRA re-evaluation decision, 
namely that the risk is acceptable if label directions are followed.2
second principle enumerates the nested authority of provinces to reg
pesticides in a manner more restrictive than the PMRA.279 The
notes that, subject to applicable laws, municipalities may also ap
pesticide regulation that is more restrictive than the PMRA or the 
provincial government, in this case, the government of Québec.280
Both the federal government and Dow framed the settlemen
victory.281 Canada’s Minister of International Trade, described
settlement as confirming “the right of governments 
sticides,” a right that “will not be compromised by Can
participation in NAFTA or any other trade agreement.”282
As a sign of its success, Dow saw the fact that Québec pu
acknowledged the PMRA risk assessment conclusion. “What was
important to Dow AgroSciences is that [Québec] clarify their persp
on 2,4-D.”283 In contrast, environmental groups saw the statement b
Québec as saving face for Dow and supporting the view that Dow w
not have won the case. CELA’s Executive Director and counsel in
Supreme Court intervention in Hudson noted that “the Qu
governme t has given nothing away legally with this agreemen
affected.”284
a)-(c). 
th Sides
tor State 
ADA, www.sierraclub.ca/en/trade-and-environment/nafta-dispute-
settle
nt with Dow 
media_commerce/comm/news-
comm
283 NAFTA Pesticide Ban Challenge Settled Without Money, CBC NEWS,
www.cbc.ca/news/canada/prince-edward-island/story/2011/05/30/nafta-pesticide-ban-challenge-
settled.html (last updated May 30, 2011). 
284 Press Release, Canadian Envtl. Law Ass’n, supra note 178. 
276 Id. ¶ 3(
277 Id. ¶ 3(a). 
278 Id.
279 Id. ¶ 3(b). 
280 Id. ¶ 3(c). 
281 Janet M. Eaton, NAFTA Dispute Settlement over Québec Pesticide Ban Has Bo
Claiming Victory While the Real Issue Still Remains—the Need To Ban NAFTA's Inves
Clause, SIERRA CLUB OF CAN
ment-over-quebec-pesticide-ban-has-both-sides-claiming-vic (May 5, 2011). 
282 Press Release, Foreign Affairs, Trade & Dev., Canada Welcomes Agreeme
Ag ay 27, 2011), availroSciences (M able at www.international.gc.ca/
uniques/2011/145.aspx?view=d. 
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Court
-law and all municipal and provincial bans are 
still on firm legal footing.”285
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sense
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ss or 
some 
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tially 
undermine domestic legislation and court rulings.
The Dow claim, with its singular focus on 2,4-D, was 
unsuccessful294 in repealing or amending Québec’s popular provincial 
paid in this settlement, not even a token amount, and the Supreme 
decision on the Hudson by
The fight for cosmetic pesticide bans in Canada rema
grassroots movement in every sense of the phrase. It originated in p
school grounds, and neighbourhoods among people who worke
political change with the level of government closest to them.286 Eve
before the country’s highest Court, the legal issues turned on wh
local jurisdiction existed to take precautionary action in the fa
uncertainty and risk as it was perceived at the local level.287 Bo
Supreme Court and ultimately the Settlement Agreement in the Dow
confirmed the nested legislative authority for local governments to a
In hindsight, early warnings were prescient about two 
addressed in this Article: the threat of key NAFTA provisions to p
interest environmental law289 and the need for precautionary respon
the face of widespread exposure to low levels of multiple 
substances.290 The wisdom of the latter continues to be confirme
extensive and credible scientific evidence, notably, but not limited to
multiple challenges of low-level exposure to endocrine disru
chemicals.291 Despite the scientific complexities, a common 
understanding of this fact is illustrated by longstanding and widesp
support among the Canadian public for the logic of banning needle
“cosmetic” exposure to pesticides.292 For the former, while 
procedural safeguards now exist with varying degrees of successfu
implementation to improve public access to disputes before NA
tribunals, investors continue to have rights and tools that can poten
293
, III.F. 
2; AUDLEY, supra note 2; Swenarchuk, supra note 2. 
21; see also supra Part III.E. 
291 WORLD HEALTH ORG. & UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, supra note 23. 
292 See discussion supra Part II.A-E. 
293 See discussion supra Part III.A.1-4. 
294 See discussion supra Part III.B.F. 
285 Id.
286 See supra Part II.A-B. 
287 See discussion supra Part II.C.2. 
288 See discussion supra Part II.C.2
289 JOHNSON & BEAULIEU, supra note
290 COLBORN ET AL., supra note 
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 April 
t refused to enter into any further 
in ontaining
IS
ts on 
. Nor 
will the Government support provisions that would constrain the 
ability of Australian governments to make laws on social, 
environmental and economic matters in circumstances where those 
law295 banning the use of certain pesticides, or in deterring 
provinces such as Ontario from creating the most comprehe
cosmetic pesticide ban in North America.296 Nevertheless, all sides 
this debate claimed “success” in some form. Dow got a p
acknowledgement from Québec of the federal government’s
assessment conclusions,297 though no compensati
Environmentalists held onto both the Québec law and the knowledg
NAFTA seemed unable to deter similar laws, grounded in
precautionary principle, from being enacted in other provinces.29
federal government described the result as confirming the rig
governments to regulate the use of pesticides and the Q
government retained its pesticide ban.300
Despite varied perspectives on the outcome, the Dow case
others like it, illustrates how NAFTA’s Chapter 11 ISDS mechanism
can be, and have been, used to try and reverse, and arguably 
similar domestic public interest measures.301 Under Chapter 11, in
rights can trump public interest rights, chiefly on account of provi
concerning the legitimate expectations of investors in Artic
10, the singular trade focus in NAFTA overall, and the a
procedures with their lack of accompanying judicial safeguards.302
In the unlikely event that Chapter 11 were removed from NAFT
would be in keeping with recent steps taken in Australia where, in
2011, the Australian governmen
ternational investment agreements with developed countries c
DS provisions on the basis that they: 
[do] not support provisions that would confer greater legal righ
foreign businesses than those available to domestic businesses
295 Pesticides Act, R.S.Q., c. P-9.3, r. 1 (Can.). 
supra Part II.D-E, G.
t, ¶ 3(a)-
May 25, 2011), available at www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
com
; see also Press Release, Canadian Envtl. Law Ass’n, supra
note 178. 
300 Press Release, Foreign Affairs, Trade & Dev., supra note 282. 
301 MANN, supra note 111, at 37-46; Van Harten, supra note 124, at 43. 
302 See discussion supra Part III.A.1-4. 
296 See discussion 
297 Dow AgroSciences v. Gov’t of Can., NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Settlement Agreemen
(c) (
merciaux/assets/pdfs/disp-diff/dow-03.pdf. 
298 Id. ¶ 2. 
299 See discussion supra Part III.F
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equally sophisticated legislative and judicial systems. 
laws do not discriminate between domestic and foreign busi
This recognition by the Australian government underscore
problem illustrated by the use of ISDS provisions under NA
including the rich irony in the Dow case.304 Such investor 
originated in ISDS mechanisms intended to protect investors fro
vagaries of less developed legislative and judicial systems.305 Yet,
same mechanisms can be used to undermine domestic public in
regulation that, in this case, was the result of many years of due pr
in Canadian lawmaking and the Canadian courts.306 Moreove
procedural mechanisms to protect these investor rights under Chap
also deny the public the same rights to fully participate in the arbit
process.307 The Dow case illustrates that Chapter 11 investor righ
misplaced within an investment agreement between nations t
GOVERNMENT TRADE POLICY STATEMENT: TRADING OUR
WA PROSPERITY 14 (Apr. 2011), available at 
pdf e%20Policy%20Statement.pdf. 
304 See discussion supra Part III.D. 
305 TIENHAARA, supra note 117, at 48. 
306 See discussion supra Part II.B-E, G. 
307 See discussion supra Part III.A.1, D. 
303 AUSTRALIAN GOV’T, GILLARD
Y
.aigroup.asn.au/trade/Gillard%20Trad
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Interest Environmental an
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ed US $250 million 
in damages. 
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$13 million. 
NoI:
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the federal environmental 
ban on the impo
international trade 
gasoline additive
The ban was ba
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neurotoxicity and its 
ged Claim
Settle
potential to inte
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NoI
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308 The information in this table has been primarily reproduced with the permissio
Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives. CANADIAN CENTRE FOR POLICY ALTS., NAFTA C
11 INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES
n of the 
HAPTER 
(Oct. 1, 2010), available at 
www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/National%20Office/2010/11/NAF
TA%20Dispute%20Table.pdf; see also PUBLIC CITIZEN, TABLE OF FOREIGN INVESTOR–STATE 
CASES AND CLAIMS UNDER NAFTA AND OTHER U.S. TRADE DEALS 6-13 (Mar. 2013), available at
www.citizen.org/documents/investor-state-chart.pdf. 
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